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ICCPR OP 2 Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
ICC   The International Criminal Court  
ICJ   The International Court of Justice 
ICTY   The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background to the Study  
Mutual legal assistance (herein “MLA” or “assistance”) is a practice through which one State 
provides assistance to another State with evidence and/or intelligence, which is used in the 
criminal investigation and prosecution for offences in the latter State.1   The prosecuting or 
judicial authority of one State makes a specific request to another State for assistance, 2 
including for “the provision of evidence, documentary or viva voce, for use abroad; the 
search and seizure of evidence for use in foreign proceedings; the transfer of witnesses for 
interview; and the serving of documents originating in another jurisdiction.” 3   With our 
increasingly globalised world, it is clear that States need to cooperate with one another in this 
manner, in order to sufficiently investigate and prosecute various criminal matters.  However, 
a legal, political and moral dilemma emerges when abolitionist States provide MLA to non-
abolitionist States, and that assistance facilitates the use of the death penalty.4    
MLA is largely a creature of treaty law, both multilaterally (such as the European Convention 
on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters)5 and bilaterally (many bilateral treaties are 
modelled on the United Nations (“UN”) Model Law on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters).6    There is no explicit statement in any of these treaties that MLA must be withheld 
without obtaining assurances that judicial execution will not be imposed (“Death Penalty 
                                                        
1 Bharat Malkani, "The Obligation to Refrain from Assisting the Use of the Death Penalty", in International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 62(3), pp. 523-556, 2013, p. 541.  
2 Ibid. 
3 Robert Currie, “Human Rights and International Mutual Legal Assistance: Resolving the Tension”, Criminal 
Law Forum, vol. 11, pp. 143-181, 2000, (page number unknown – no page numbers provided in SSRN version 
of text download). 
4 Bharat Malkani, Written Submission to the Human Rights Committee: General discussion on the preparation 
for General Comment on Article 6 (Right to Life) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 14 
July 2015, para. 5. 
5 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, concluded 20 April 1959, entered into force 
12 June 1962, ETS No.030, Council of Europe. 
6 General Assembly, Model Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, A/RES/45/117, 14 
December 1990.    See also supra., (note 4), Bharat Malkani (Written Submission to the HRC), para. 8. 
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Assurances”).  However, many abolitionist States have policies stating that they will consider 
withholding MLA in the absence of death penalty assurances.7 
The European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) prohibit their State parties from extraditing individuals 
to death penalty retentionist States, where there is foreseeable risk of the death penalty being 
imposed (and where the State has not first obtained assurances that the individuals will not be 
subjected to capital punishment).  What is not clear, however, is whether this prohibition 
extends to circumstances beyond extradition, namely to the situation where abolitionist States 
wish to provide MLA to retentionist States, where such assistance may similarly facilitate the 
use of the death penalty in the MLA-receiving State.  
This issue has been highlighted in the recent United Kingdom (“UK”) decisions in the case 
Maha Elgizouli, first examined by the Queen’s Bench,8 and then, on appeal, by the Supreme 
Court.9    This case concerned MLA requests to aid in the prosecution of a British individual 
(now stripped of his citizenship), who allegedly belonged to an Islamic State cell involved in 
the murder of hostages in Syria.   The Queen’s Bench controversially found that it was lawful 
for the UK Home Secretary to authorise the provision of MLA to the United States (“US”), in 
support of the criminal investigation that could lead to prosecution for offences that carry a 
death penalty sentence, without first obtaining assurances that the death penalty will not be 
imposed.10    While the Supreme Court overturned the Queen’s Bench decision, it did so on 
the basis of the MLA consisting of personal data within the meaning of the Data Protection 
                                                        
7 See e.g. Gov.UK website, “UK Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Guidance”, Annex B: Checklist for 
case specific assistance, published 15 December 2011, last updated 26 January 2017, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/overseas-security-and-justice-assistance-osja-guidance (last 
accessed 14 April 2020), stage 3, para. 9.    This document sets out procedures that should be followed by 
British authorities when providing MLA, and states that “a) Written assurances should be sought before 
agreeing to the provision of assistance that anyone found guilty would not face the death penalty”, and “b) 
Where no assurances are forthcoming or where there are strong reasons not to seek assurances, the case should 
automatically be deemed ‘High Risk’ and FCO Ministers should be consulted to determine whether, given the 
specific circumstances of the case, we should nevertheless provide assistance.” (italics added, underlining found 
in original).    See also supra., (note 4), Barhat Malkaini (written submission to the HRC), paras. 8-12. 
8 The Queen (on the application of Maha El Gizouli) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
Judgment of 18 Jan 2019, High Court of Justice Queen’s Bench Division, United Kingdom, CO/3449/2018.  
9 Elgizouli (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent), Judgment of 25 March 
2020, Supreme Court, United Kingdom, [2020] UKSC 10.    (Note in Queen’s Bench case, surname spelled “El 
Gizouli”, and in Supreme Court case “Elgizouli”. This study adopts the latter spelling). 
10 Supra., (note 8), Maha Elgizouli (QB decision), paras. 65-66, 96, 218. 
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Act 2018,11 concluding that the decision to provide such information was unlawful under Part 
3 of that Act.12   On the other ground of appeal, whether it was unlawful for the UK to 
facilitate the use of the death penalty in a foreign State through provision of MLA,13 the 
majority found that the law had not yet developed so as to prohibit provision of MLA in such 
circumstances.14   However, Lord Kerr’s judgment disagreed with the majority, finding the 
Home Secretary’s decision to provide MLA without requisite assurances unlawful on both 
grounds of appeal. 
1.2. Research Aim and Question 
Although Maha Elgizouli is a domestic rather than an international decision, this case 
highlights the lack of certainty in this area (especially given that the UK Human Rights Act 
incorporates the ECHR into UK domestic law).15  The problem addressed in this study has 
yet to be scrutinised on an international level, relevant conventions are silent on the subject, 
and even esteemed Supreme Court justices disagree on the status of international and 
domestic law on the matter.   More than two thirds of States worldwide have abolished the 
death penalty in law or in practice,16 and thus the clarification of legal obligations would 
impact a large number of States, as well as clarify the extent of relevant fundamental rights 
for individuals in such circumstances.  With States routinely providing MLA to one another 
                                                        
11 Data Protection Act, United Kingdom, Royal Assent 23 May 2018, 2018/c/12.      The Act deals with, among 
other aspects, the transfer of personal data to third countries or international organisations, setting out general 
conditions which apply to such transfers. The SC found the conditions were not met.  The Act and reasoning 
will not be analysed in this study, as it is outside of the ambit of this thesis. 
12 Supra., (note 9), Maha Elgizouli (SC decision), para. 3.   
13 This ground of appeal was also raised by the Queen’s Bench as a question of public importance: “Whether it 
is unlawful for the Secretary of State to exercise his power to provide MLA so as to provide evidence to a 
foreign state that will facilitate the imposition of the death penalty in that state on the individual in respect of 
whom the evidence is sought.”  Supra., (note 9), Maha Elgizouli (SC decision), paras. 3 and 19. 
14 Supra., (note 9), Maha Elgizouli (SC decision), para. 4. 
15 See Human Rights Act 1998, United Kingdom, Royal Assent 9 November 1998, 1998/c/42. 
16 Statistics of July 2018 – Number of States who are Abolitionist for all crimes: 106; Abolitionist for “ordinary 
crimes” only: 8; Abolitionist in practice: 28.  Total Abolitionist in Law or in Practice: 142; Total Retentionist: 
56.  Statistics available from:  Amnesty International, “Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries as of July 2018”, 
index: 50/6665/2017, (State list, published July 2020), available at: 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ACT5066652017ENGLISH.pdf, (last visited 23 March 2020).  
This study relates only to those abolitionist States party to the ECHR and the ICCPR. For figures, see notes 28, 
29, 34, 35 and 48 (ratification figures of the ECHR and the ICCPR and their death penalty-related protocols). 
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in criminal matters, and with the emerging challenge presented by the prosecution of Foreign 
Terrorist Fighters (“FTF”),17 there is a growing need for legal clarity in this area.     
Therefore, this study aims to clarify abolitionist States legal obligations, by answering the 
following research question:  Are death penalty abolitionist States who are party to the 
European Convention on Human Rights and/or the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights prohibited from providing Mutual Legal Assistance to death penalty 
retentionist States for use in criminal proceedings that may result in prosecution for offences 
carrying the death penalty, when the abolitionist State has not obtained adequate assurances 
from the retentionist State that the death penalty will not be imposed? 
1.3. Method and Material    
To answer this research question, this thesis adopts a doctrinal method, employing legal 
research methodology.  This study discerns and analyses the current status of the law by 
locating and examining the relevant primary and secondary sources of law governing the 
field of this study.  More specifically, the status of the law in this area is ascertained through 
analysing applicable primary sources (in this context, particularly the law codified in relevant 
international conventions); whereby the meaning and interpretation of relevant provisions is 
determined through examining secondary sources, namely the jurisprudence of relevant 
judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, and the discussions of highly qualified academics (as 
subsidiary means for determining the rules of law).  The relationship between relevant legal 
rules and principles is analysed, with the aim of solving the aforementioned ambiguities in 
the existing law, and exposing what the law is in the studied area. 
The primary legal sources used are the ECHR and the ICCPR. Death penalty-related 
additional protocols of the respective conventions are also analysed, as they codify crucial 
international law for the question at hand.    As the text of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union (“the EU Charter”) is, by reason of being a younger instrument, in 
                                                        
17 See Resolution 2178, adopted by the United Nations Security Council, S/RES/2178, 24 September 2014.    
“Foreign Terrorist Fighters” defined as “...individuals who travel to a State other than their State of residence or 
nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the 
providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict.” 
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conformity with the ECHR position on this matter (as a manifestation of the more modern 
view of European states), and it is only applicable when European Union (“EU”) law is being 
applied, the EU Charter will only be used to emphasise the existence of European consensus 
on death penalty abolition and the prohibition of extradition where there is risk of capital 
punishment.  When parallels are being drawn between complicity in torture and complicity in 
death penalty, this study also analyses aspects of the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”).  
While analysis of the ICCPR in this study is relevant from a global perspective (owing to the 
content and vast global ratification of the ICCPR), the ECHR’s relevance is limited to 
Council of Europe (“CoE”) Member States (thus it is only relevant from the regional 
perspective of Europe).  The reason this thesis also examines the regional perspective of 
Europe in this regard it threefold: 1) out of the regional human rights systems, Europe is the 
only wholly death penalty abolitionist region (with the exception of Belarus, which is not a 
Member State of the CoE),18 whereby the question of non-facilitation of death penalty arises 
more frequently in the European context; 2) capital punishment contravenes the ECHR,19 
whereas it does not, in and of itself, contravene other overarching regional human rights 
conventions (but for the aforementioned EU Charter, also relevant only from a European 
perspective); 3) lending to points 1 and 2, there is significant jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) which very applicable and useful for the question of this 
study (regarding non-facilitation of capital punishment, prohibition of extradition to face the 
death penalty and so on), and this jurisprudence is applicable to the region of Europe as a 
whole. 
To provide authoritative interpretation to the relevant ECHR and ICCPR rights, this study 
analyses secondary sources, most notably, jurisprudence of the ECtHR and of the Human 
Rights Committee (“HRC”).   Only leading or otherwise notable cases in the relevant areas 
are analysed, due to the large body of case law of both the ECtHR and HRC.  This includes, 
but is not limited to, jurisprudence establishing the ECHR and HRC’s positions on the death 
penalty, cases outlining (and providing a rationale for) the prohibition of extradition to States 
where there is risk of imposition of death penalty, and cases establishing and widening the 
                                                        
18 CoE has 47 Member States, including all of Europe except for Belarus (see Council of Europe Website, “Our 
Member States”: https://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/our-member-states, last visited 11 May 2020). 
19 See an analysis of the ECHR’s prohibition of death penalty under subheading 2.1. of this study. 
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scope of the respective conventions extraterritorial protective ambit. The HRC’s General 
Comments are also utilised, as they are authoritative and comprehensive interpretations of 
substantive ICCPR rights and ICCPR State Party obligations. 
The International Law Commission’s (“ILC”) Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Unlawful Acts (“ILC Articles”) will also be analysed in this study.  The legal status of these 
Articles is unresolved in the international community, some suggesting they are secondary 
sources or evidence of law, while others arguing they represent customary law (which would 
make them a primary source of law as per Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice).20   The ILC Articles have not been transformed into a convention, rather the 
document was drafted and adopted by the ILC, and then adopted as a resolution of the United 
Nations (“UN”) General Assembly (“UNGA”).  However, the ILC Articles “are extensively 
used and quoted in international practice and [in] the jurisprudence of national and 
international tribunals”, 21  and “referred to in arguments before international tribunals, in 
arbitral decisions, in state practice and in separate opinions of the International [Criminal] 
Court”.22   The position adopted in this study is that the ILC Articles on State Responsibility 
are not a “source of law”, and rather are “evidence of a source of law”.23   While they may 
not be primary rules, the Articles on State Responsibility and the ILC Commentary are highly 
authoritative sources in terms of the establishment of State responsibility. This lends to the 
authoritative nature of both the ILC and the UNGA,24 the elaborate process through which 
the Articles were drafted and adopted, 25  and the extensive use of the Articles before 
international courts, tribunals and general international practice. 
For further interpretive aid, this study utilises academic discussions located in relevant 
                                                        
20 Statute of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), annexed to the Charter of the United Nations, concluded 
26 June 1945, entry into force 24 October 1945, 33 UNTS 993, Article 38(1). 
21 Robert Kolb, The International Law of State Responsibility: An Introduction, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2017, pp. 27-30. 
22 James Crawford, “The ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: A 
Retrospect”, in The American Journal of International Law, vol. 96(4), 2002, p. 889. 
23 David Caron, “The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relationship Between Form and 
Authority” in The American Journal of International Law, vol. 96(4), pp. 857-873, 2002, p. 867.  For 
discussions on authoritative nature of ILC and the Articles, especially regarding the special position of the ILC, 
and process through which the Articles were drafted, see pp. 867-872.   See also ICJ Statute, Article 38(1)(d), 
whereby work of the ILC may be seen similar in authority to the writings of highly qualified publicists (thus a 
“subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law”).  
24 Ibid., David Caron, pp. 867-872.  
25 See, e.g. James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, 
Text and Commentaries, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 60, discussing how the ILC Articles were drafted 
through prolonged discussion over several decades.   
Aliina Vegar 
 7 
journal articles and textbooks (as secondary sources) regarding State responsibility for 
internationally wrongful acts, the law on complicity, applicable ECtHR and HRC 
jurisprudence, and questions of jurisdiction.  The UK domestic decisions regarding Maha 
Elgizouli are only analysed insofar as demonstrating the legal issue. 
1.4. Limitations 
Provision of MLA in the context of this study is only one way that abolitionist States may be 
said to facilitate the extraterritorial use of the death penalty.  There are several other ways 
that abolitionist States’ actions may be argued to contribute to the death penalty, including, 
but not limited to, police-to-police assistance (where police force of one State aid the police 
force of another State), provision of funds and other resources to tackle transnational crimes 
like drug trafficking, provision of materials that are used in executions, provision of financial, 
technical and other forms of support to strengthen foreign legal systems and so on. 26   
However, in order to maintain sufficient thematic focus, this study analyses facilitation of 
death penalty solely from the perspective of provision of MLA.  This is also due to the 
author’s view that out of the above given examples, provision of MLA in criminal 
proceedings that may result in the death penalty is a form of assistance most proximate to the 
prohibited conduct (judicial execution).  Many of the arguments forwarded in this study may 
also be relevant for other forms of death penalty facilitation. 
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the legal status of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility 
is unconfirmed. However, this thesis will not delve into the discussion regarding the 
authoritative status of the ILC Articles, as the question is worthy of thorough analysis in its 
own right.  On a similar reasoning, this study will not analyse the difference between primary 
rules of law and secondary rules of law in relation to the ILC Articles.  While the topic is 
interesting, in that the distinction between the concepts is often blurred, the discussion is not 
directly relevant for the question of this thesis.  
Furthermore, as referred to in the preceding paragraph, this study is predominantly focussed 
on the ICCPR and the ECHR.  While the question of non-facilitation of capital punishment is 
                                                        
26 Supra., (note 4), para. 7. 
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also interesting from the perspective of the Inter-American and the African regional systems, 
in order to maintain sufficient focus, this study limits its analysis to the stated conventions. 
Finally, there is also growing argument that abolitionist States are legally obliged to assist 
their nationals who are facing the death penalty abroad (that being that State discretion to 
provide diplomatic protection to its nationals is tempered in cases involving abuses of 
fundamental human rights, which capital punishment is increasingly being classified as).27 If 
such an obligation exists, it may add weight to the argument that abolitionist States are 
consequently also prohibited from providing MLA to assist in capital punishment, at least in 
relation to their own current or former nationals.  However, whether or not such an obligation 
exists it is an elaborate question, which would require extensive research and analysis in its 
own right.  Thus, in order maintain sufficient focus, this study does not address this matter 
any further.  
                                                        
27 Supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 524. 
Aliina Vegar 
 9 
2. The Obligation to Seek Assurances, and Withhold Assistance in the 
Absence of Assurances: a Human Rights Perspective 
Within the human rights framework, two multilateral human rights treaties that have wide 
membership and lay out much relevant law for the case at hand are the ECHR28 and the 
ICCPR.29   The legal norms within the ECHR and ICCPR, and the jurisprudence of their 
monitoring bodies, are vital for the question of whether abolitionist States are obliged to 
obtain assurances before providing MLA in foreign criminal proceedings that may result in 
judicial execution.  Specifically, case law relating to the right to life,30 and the right to be free 
from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,31 especially in the context 
of extradition to face the death penalty, can be drawn on for the context of this study.  
This chapter analyses relevant ICCPR and ECHR doctrine, exposing and examining how 
these conventions may impose an obligation on abolitionist States to obtain death penalty 
assurances before providing MLA in foreign proceedings that may result in the death penalty, 
or withhold MLA in the absence of such assurances.  The reader is alerted at this stage that 
jurisdictional counter arguments exist, which will be comprehensively analysed in the 
following chapter.  The analysis of the present chapter is first and foremost relevant for 
establishing primary responsibility of the abolitionist State (where breach of such an 
obligation would entail the direct responsibility of the State in question, as opposed to 
derivative responsibility for complicity).32  However, the discussions of this chapter are also 
drawn on in Chapter 5, for analysis of the question of complicity in capital punishment.  
 
                                                        
28 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”), as amended 
by Protocols 11 and 14, concluded 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953, ETS No. 5.    47 
State parties, including all of Europe except for Belarus, ratification of ECHR is a prerequisite for joining the 
Council of Europe (see Council of Europe Website: https://www.coe.int/en/web/human-rights-convention/home 
(last visited 24 March 2020)). 
29 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), concluded 19 December 1966, entered into 
force 23 March 1976, UNTS vol. 999.   Ratified by 173 States (see United Nations Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights website, “status of ratification dashboard”, available at 
https://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited 24 March 2020)). 
30 ECHR Article 2, ICCPR Article 6. 
31 ECHR Article 3, ICCPR Article 7. 
32 For differentiation, see Chapters 4 and 5. For assessment of complicity in death penalty attracting derivative 
State responsibility, refer especially to Chapter 5. 
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2.1. The ECHR and the ICCPR Positions on the Death Penalty 
Both the ECHR and the ICCPR textually allow the death penalty as an express exception to 
the right to life.33    In the context of the ECHR, however, it is likely that the law within the 
Council of Europe (“CoE”) framework has evolved as to prohibit the death penalty in all 
circumstances.  This follows from the fact that most State parties have ratified the optional 
protocols to the ECHR abolishing the death penalty (first in peacetime, 34 and later in all 
circumstances35), and those States that have not ratified the relevant optional protocols36 
show consistent State practice in observing a moratorium on capital punishment.37    Thus, in 
Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v the UK, the ECtHR considered that these factors are “strongly 
indicative that Article 2 has been amended as to prohibit the death penalty in all 
circumstances.”38    
The EU framework supports this position.  Article 2 of the EU Charter provides that “No one 
shall be condemned to the death penalty”.39   The EU’s absolute opposition to death penalty 
is also supported by other EU documents,40 including, among others, the 2013 EU Guidelines 
on Death Penalty, which set out “strong and unequivocal opposition to the death penalty in 
all times and in all circumstances”; 41 the 2016 EU Regulation 2016/2134, concerning trade in 
certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
                                                        
33 ECHR Article 2(1) – “Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law.  No one shall be deprived of his life 
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this 
penalty is provided by law.”;    ICCPR article 6(1) – “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This 
right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”    ICCPR, Article 6(2) – “In 
countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most 
serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to 
the provisions of the present Covenant” 
34 Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR, concerning the abolition of the death penalty, concluded 28 April 1983, entered 
into force 1 March 1985, ETS No. 114 (“ECHR Protocol 6”).  – As of 20 March 2020, 46 member states have 
ratified Protocol 6, and Russia has signed but not ratified (see CoE website, convention list: 
www.coe.int/en/web/conventions).  
35 Protocol No. 13 to the ECHR, concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, concluded 3 
May 2002, entered into force 1 July 2003, ETS No. 187 (“ECHR Protocol 13”).  – As of 24 March 2020, 44 
member states have ratified Protocol 13.  Armenia has signed but not ratified this Protocol.  Russia and 
Azerbaijan have not signed (see CoE website, convention list: www.coe.int/en/web/conventions). 
36 Supra., (notes 34 and 35). 
37 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v the United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 2 March 
2010, Application No. 61498/08, para. 120. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“EU Charter”), concluded 7 December 2000, entered 
into force 1 December 2009, 2000/C 364/01, European Union, Article 2(2). 
40 See supra., (note 9), Maha Elgizouli (SC Decision), Lord Kerr, para. 126. 
41 Council of the European Union, EU Guidelines on Death Penalty, 8416/13 COHOM 64 PESC 403 OC 213, 
published 12 April 2013. 
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degrading treatment or punishment (with a specific focus on the death sentence rather than 
the generalised prohibition on inhumane treatment or torture);42 and paragraph 71 of the 
European Union’s Law Enforcement Directive, which obliges a data controller to “take into 
account that the personal data will not be used to request, hand down or execute a death 
penalty or any form of cruel and inhuman treatment” before providing/transferring data to a 
foreign law enforcement authority.43    Considering the positions of both the CoE and the EU 
in this regard, it is now considered that the death penalty has been removed from the 
European framework.44   
Regarding the ICCPR, Article 6(1) protects the right to life, while Article 6(2) provides that 
non-abolitionist States may, under strict circumstances, impose the death penalty. 45  It is 
apparent from Article 6 that abolition is preferred.46  This is supported by the HRC General 
Comment 6, in which the HRC provides that “abolition is desirable.”47   Furthermore, the 
Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (“ICCPR OP 2”),48 “Aiming at the Abolition of the 
Death Penalty”, provides that “No one within the jurisdiction of a State Party to the present 
Protocol shall be executed,”49 and that “Each State Party shall take all measures to abolish the 
death penalty within its jurisdiction.”50   Thus, State parties to ICCPR OP 2 are abolitionist 
States, prohibited by the ICCPR from imposing judicial execution within their jurisdiction.  
As mentioned above, both the ECHR and the ICCPR also codify the right to be free from 
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (ECHR Article 3, and ICCPR 
                                                        
42 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) 2016/2134, concerning trade in 
certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, document 32016R2134, 23 November 2016, para. 71. 
43 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Directive (EU) 2016/680, (European Union’s Law 
Enforcement Directive), on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by 
competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences, and on the free movement of such data, Document 32016L0680, 27 April 2016. 
44 With the exception of Belarus, which is not a CoE Member State (see note 18). 
45 See (note 13) above. 
46 Amrita Mukherjee, “The ICCPR as a ‘Living Instrument’: The death penalty as cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment”, in The Journal of Criminal Law, 68(6), pp. 507-519, 2004, p. 508. 
47 General Comment No. 6, Human Rights Committee, Article 6: right to life, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6, 12 
May 2003, para. 6.     Note, General Comment 6 has now been replaced by:  General Comment No. 36, Human 
Rights Committee, Article 6: right to life, UN Doc. CCPR/G/GC/36, 30 October 2018. 
48 Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR OP 2”), aiming 
at the abolition of the death penalty, concluded 15 December 1989, entered into force 11 July 1991, UNTS vol. 
1642.  Ratified by 88 States, (see United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights website 
“status of ratification dashboard”: https://indicators.ohchr.org/ (accessed, 24 March 2020)). 
49 ICCPR OP 2, Article 1(1). 
50 ICCPR OP 2, Article 1(2). 
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Article 7).  Originally the death penalty, in and of itself, was not found in either context to 
constitute treatment contrary to the right to be free from torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.  Rather, certain methods of execution and death row conditions 
were deemed in both contexts to contradict ECHR Article 3 and ICCPR Article 7. 51   
However, as discussed at 2.2.2.1. and 2.2.2.2. below, the law has since developed to consider 
that extradition to face the death penalty in and of itself constitutes treatment contrary to the 
right to be free from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in both 
contexts. 
2.2. Prohibition of Extradition Without Obtaining Death Penalty Assurances 
Both the ECHR and the ICCPR protective ambits have evolved to prohibit abolitionist States 
from extraditing individuals where there is a real risk of facing the death penalty in foreign 
States (without having obtained appropriate death penalty assurances).    This is so, despite a 
lack of express prohibition to that effect in either convention. 
2.2.1. When There Was No Obligation to Refuse Extradition 
In the early 1990s, there was no specific legal obligation on abolitionist States to refuse 
extradition to retentionist States to face judicial execution.52   In the ECHR context, this was 
clear from the case, Soering v the UK,53  where the applicant argued that his proposed 
extradition to the US would violate his rights under the ECHR, as it would expose him to a 
real risk of being subjected to the death penalty.  While the ECtHR did find that the UK was 
prohibited from extraditing Soering, it was not based on a finding that extradition would 
violate his right to life, as Article 2(2) explicitly allows for death penalty.   Rather, they relied 
                                                        
51 For ECHR, see e.g. Soering v the United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 7 July 
1989, Application No. 1438/88 – which established the non-refoulement principle in the ECHR (derived from 
Article 3). In this case, extradition was not permitted on the grounds that the long wait on death row would 
amount to treatment contrary to ECHR Article 3, due to the associated fear, uncertainty and human anguish;       
For ICCPR, see e.g. Francis v Jamaica, Human Rights Committee, Views adopted 3 August 1995, 
Communication No. 606/1994, paras. 91-92 – where the Applicant’s long wait on death row and associated 
deterioration of the Applicant’s mental state (satisfying the requirement for “further compelling circumstances” 
for finding violation), was found to be treatment contrary to ICCPR Article 7. 
52 Supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 533. 
53 Supra., (note 51), Soering v the UK, “death row phenomenon” contrary to Article 3. 
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on the conditions and manner in which the death penalty would occur, whereby the risk of 
suffering the “death row phenomenon” while awaiting execution was found to be treatment 
contrary to Article 3.54   Thus, during this time, if there were no aggravating factors igniting 
Article 3 (like the “death row phenomenon”), extradition to face the death penalty was 
permissible for CoE member States. 
During this time, the ICCPR approach was similar.   In Kindler v Canada,55 the HRC upheld 
the Canadian Supreme Court decision that the risk of death penalty did not in and of itself 
oblige Canada to refuse extradition in the absence of death penalty assurances.56  The HRC 
elaborated that Canada had no duty to demand death penalty assurances in the case.57 
2.2.2. The Obligation to Refuse Extradition 
2.2.2.1.   The ECHR and the EU Charter 
Regarding the ECHR, the law concerning extradition to face ECHR-contrary treatment has 
since developed, leading to the widely accepted position that the ECHR now prohibits 
contracting States from extraditing or otherwise expelling individuals to face the death 
penalty in retentionist States.  This prohibition is no longer dependent on the death-row 
phenomenon, nor the manner or conditions of detainment constituting treatment contrary to 
ECHR Article 3.  The ECtHR has found that extradition to face the death penalty itself 
violates ECHR Article 3,58 as well as Article 2.59   The ECtHR’s conclusion that the death 
penalty itself violates Article 3 can be seen in the aforementioned case Al-Saadoon and 
                                                        
54 Ibid., Soering v UK, para. 111. 
55 Kindler v Canada, Human Rights Committee, Views adopted 30 July 1993, Communication No. 470/1991. 
56 Original Canada Supreme Court case: Kindler v Canada (Minister of Justice), Judgment of 21 February 1991, 
Supreme Court, Canada, 2 SCR 779.  See also supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 532. 
57 Ibid., (note 55), Kindler v Canada (HRC), para. 14.6. 
58 Al Nashiri v. Poland, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 16 February 2014, Application No. 
28761/11, para. 577: “Judicial execution involves the deliberate and premeditated destruction of a human being 
by the State authorities. Whatever the method of execution, the extinction of life involves some physical pain. In 
addition, the foreknowledge of death at the hands of the State must inevitably give rise to intense psychological 
suffering.”;  see also supra., (note 37), Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v the UK, para. 144, where the ECtHR found 
that, regardless of eventual result, the applicants had been subjected “to the fear of execution by the Iraqi 
authorities.” This alone amounted to psychological suffering to the nature and degree required to contravene 
ECHR Article 3. 
59 Ibid., Al Nashiri v Poland, paras. 579; and F.G. v Sweden, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 23 
March 2016, Application No. 43611/11, para. 110. 
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Mufdhi v the UK, where the ECtHR concluded that “the death penalty, which involved the 
deliberate and premeditated destruction of a human being by the State authorities, 
causing physical pain and intense psychological suffering as a result of the foreknowledge of 
death, could be considered inhuman and degrading and, as such, contrary to Article 3 of the 
Convention.”60 
In Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v the UK, where the ECtHR also accepted that State practice is 
likely to have amended Article 2 to prohibit death penalty in all circumstances,61 the ECtHR 
was asked to consider the legal ramifications of the transfer of prisoners to stand trial in Iraq.   
The ECtHR found that the transfer presented real risk of the applicants being subjected to 
capital punishment, and found that “Article 2 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 
13 prohibit the extradition or deportation of an individual to another State where substantial 
grounds have been shown for believing that he or she would face a real risk of being 
subjected to the death penalty there.”62  The ECtHR stated that: 
“[T]he Court considers that, in the absence of any such binding assurance, the referral 
of the applicants’ cases to the Iraqi courts and their physical transfer to the custody of 
the Iraqi authorities failed to take proper account of the United Kingdom’s obligations 
under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 
13 since, throughout the period in question, there were substantial grounds for 
believing that the applicants would face a real risk of being sentenced to death and 
executed.”63 
In Al Nashiri v Poland, concerning unlawful rendition, the ECtHR found that Poland’s 
assistance in the applicant’s transfer from Poland to the US violated both Article 2 and 3 of 
the ECHR, due to the real and foreseeable risk that the applicant would be exposed to capital 
punishment in the US.  In arriving at this conclusion, the ECtHR provided that: “Article 2 of 
the Convention prohibits the extradition or deportation of an individual to another State 
where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that he or she would face a real risk 
of being subjected to the death penalty there.”64  The ECtHR reiterated this position in F.G. v 
Sweden, and found, due to risk of capital punishment, Sweden would be in violation of both 
                                                        
60 European Court of Human Rights Registry, Press release of the ECHR: Chamber Judgment of Al-Saadoon 
and Mufdhi v the United Kingdom, Application No. 61498/08, press release published 2 March 2010. 
61 See “ECHR and ICCPR positions on death penalty” (subheading 2.1 above). 
62 Supra., (note 37), Al-Saadoon and Mufhdi v the UK, para. 123.  The ECtHR unanimously found violation of 
Article 3. In finding that Article 3 was violated, the ECtHR decided in did not need to consider whether the 
same facts constituted a violation of Article 2 (see paras. 144-145 of judgment). 
63 Ibid., para. 143. 
64 Supra., (note 58), Al Nashiri v Poland, paras. 576-579.  
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Articles 2 and 3 if they returned the applicant to Iran without an ex nuc assessment by the 
Swedish authorities of the consequences of this action. In coming to this conclusion, the 
ECtHR stated that: 
“At the outset the Court observes that in the context of expulsion, where there are 
substantial grounds to believe that the person in question, if expelled, would face a 
real risk of capital punishment, torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment in the destination country, both Articles 2 and 3 imply that the 
Contracting State must not expel that person.”65 
Thus, despite the absence of a provision to this effect, it is now widely accepted that the 
ECHR prohibits contracting States from extraditing or otherwise expelling individuals where 
there are substantial grounds for believing that the individual would face a real risk of being 
subjected to the death penalty.   If an individual were to be extradited or expelled in such 
circumstances, this conduct would contradict both Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR.  Extradition 
may only be permissible in such circumstances upon obtaining assurances from the receiving 
State that the death penalty will not be imposed.66     
Again, the EU framework supports this legal position.   Article 19(2) of the EU Charter, as a 
younger instrument, textually reflects this evolved legal perspective. The EU Charter 
explicitly provides that in the EU Member States, “No one may be removed, expelled or 
extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the 
death penalty […]”67  
2.2.2.2.   The ICCPR  
This approach has also been followed by the HRC.  While the ICCPR textually allows for 
death penalty under certain strict circumstances (as discussed above), and does not expressly 
prohibit extradition to face the death penalty in foreign States, the law has evolved to reflect 
the CoE and EU positions outlined above (in respect of abolitionist State parties).    
                                                        
65 Supra., (note 59), F.G. v Sweden, para. 110. 
66 Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks, & Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White and Ovey: The European Convention on 
Human Rights, 7th edition, Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 152.     See e.g. Al Nashiri v. Poland (note x), para. 
589, where the ECtHR required the Polish government to seek assurances from the US authorities that the 
Applicant will not be subjected to the death penalty. 
67 EU Charter, Article 19(2). 
Aliina Vegar 
 16 
The HRC reversed its decision in Kindler v Canada, in the case Judge v Canada.68   In Judge 
v Canada, the HRC reflected that “there has been a broadening international consensus in 
favour of abolition of the death penalty”,69 meaning that “[f]or countries that have abolished 
the death penalty, there is an obligation not to expose a person to the real risk of its 
application.”70    In Judge v Canada, the HRC recognised that if an abolitionist State exposed 
an individual to risk of death penalty in that manner, it would violate the right to life under 
the ICCPR.71  This is an important development as previously the HRC had only prevented 
extradition/expulsion when it considered the circumstances or manner of execution to 
contradict ICCPR Article 7.72   
In coming to the conclusion that extradition in such circumstances could violate Article 6, the 
HRC stated that: “[f]or countries that have abolished the death penalty, […] they may not 
remove, either by deportation or extradition, individuals from their jurisdiction if it may be 
reasonably anticipated that they will be sentenced to death, without ensuring that the death 
sentence would not be carried out.”73 
Similarly, the HRC has found that extradition/expulsion in circumstances where an individual 
is exposed to real risk of capital punishment in and of itself contravenes ICCPR Article 7 
(thus without needing to argue that the manner of execution or conditions on death row 
constitutes Article 7-contrary treatment).   This is reflected in Yin Fong v Australia, where the 
HRC stated it was aware of the stress and anxiety that would be caused for an individual 
exposed to the risk of capital punishment.74  The HRC found that, in the event that Australia 
forcibly removed the author without adequate assurances, the risk of capital punishment 
alone constituted violation of the author’s rights under Article 7,75 (without discussion on the 
death row circumstances or methods of execution).   In this case, the HRC also found that the 
Article 6 right to life would be violated in these circumstances.76 
                                                        
68 Judge v Canada, Human Rights Committee, Views adopted 5 August 2002, Communication No. 829/1998. 
69 Ibid., para. 10.3. 
70 Ibid., para. 10.4. 
71 Ibid., para. 10.6.  Note, since the HRC found violation of Article 6, they did not consider it necessary to 
address whether Article 7 had also been violated (see para. 10.10). 
72 Supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 533.      
73 Supra., (note 68), Judge v Canada, para. 10.4. 
74 Yin Fong v Australia, Human Rights Committee, Views adopted 23 October 2009, Communication No. 
1442/2005, para. 9.7. 
75 Ibid., para 9.8. 
76 Ibid. 
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Thus, it is now accepted that ICCPR contracting States are prohibited from extraditing 
individuals where there is risk of being subjected to the death penalty; and to do so without 
death penalty assurances would contradict ICCPR Article 6 and/or Article 7.  This position is 
emphasised in HRC General Comments.  In General Comment 31, the HRC provides that:  
“[…] the article 2 obligation requiring that States Parties respect and ensure the 
Covenant rights for all persons in their territory and all persons under their control 
entails an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from 
their territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk 
of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant, 
either in the country to which removal is to be effected or in any country to which the 
person may subsequently be removed.”77    
A more recent General Comment elaborates on this position.  In General Comment 36, the 
HRC provides that: “The duty to respect and ensure the right to life requires States parties to 
refrain from deporting, extraditing or otherwise transferring individuals to countries in which 
there are substantial grounds for believing that a real risk exists that their right to life under 
article 6 of the Covenant would be violated.”78  Furthermore, “[…] it would be contrary to 
article 6 to extradite an individual from a country that abolished the death penalty to a 
country in which he or she may face the death penalty.”79   Moreover: 
“States parties that abolished the death penalty cannot deport, extradite or otherwise 
transfer persons to a country in which they are facing criminal charges that carry the 
death penalty, unless credible and effective assurances against the imposition of the death 
penalty have been obtained. In the same vein, the obligation not to reintroduce the death 
penalty for any specific crime requires States parties not to deport, extradite or otherwise 
transfer an individual to a country in which he or she is expected to stand trial for a 
capital offence, if the same offence does not carry the death penalty in the removing 
State, unless credible and effective assurances against exposing the individual to the death 
penalty have been obtained.” 80   
Thus, it is clear that abolitionist States who are party to the ICCPR are prohibited from 
extraditing individuals to face the death penalty in foreign States.  This prohibition is so for 
all ICCPR State parties who have abolished the death penalty, not only for those abolitionist 
                                                        
77 General Comment No. 31, Human Rights Committee, Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on 
states Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev 1/Add.13, 29 March 2004, para. 12. 
78 Supra., (note 47), General Comment No. 36, This position originally stated and confirmed by the HRC in 
supra., (note 55), Kindler v Canada, paras. 13.1-13.2. 
79 Ibid., (General Comment 36), para. 30.  This position comes from HRC case law. See e.g. Supra., (note 74), 
Yin Fong v Australia, para. 9.7. (italics in original). 
80 Ibid., (General Comment 36), para. 34.    See also Supra., (note 68), Judge v Canada, para. 10.6. 
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States who have ratified ICCPR OP 2.81    Extradition would only be permissible in such 
circumstances on obtaining assurances from the receiving State that the death penalty will not 
be imposed.82 
2.3. Rationale Behind the Legal Obligation to Withhold Assistance in the Absence of 
Death Penalty Assurances 
The scope and manner of the obligation not to extradite individuals to face execution “has 
ramifications for the argument that abolitionist States are obliged to refrain from assisting the 
use of the death penalty in other ways.”83   There are many parallels that can be drawn 
between the ECtHR and HRC’s rationales to broaden their respective convention’s protective 
ambits to cover extradition cases and the provision of MLA to foreign retentionist States in 
the context of this study.   As extradition can even be argued to be a type of MLA,84 it would 
seem logical that abolitionist States should thus also refuse the provision of MLA without 
death penalty assurances.  This study respectfully submits that the UK Queen’s Bench and 
the majority in the Supreme Court were incorrect in their findings in Maha Elgizouli that 
there is no human rights obligation requiring the UK to withhold provision of MLA where 
there is a risk that this would lead to imposition of the death penalty.  “While States must be 
able to assist each other in the fight against crime, the prohibition and opposition of the death 
penalty is not something that can be set aside for the sake of convenience.”85 
 
 
                                                        
81 Supra., (note 68), Judge v Canada, para. 10.6: “For these reasons, the Committee considers that Canada, as a 
State party which has abolished the death penalty, irrespective of whether it has not yet ratified the Second 
Optional Protocol to the Covenant Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, violated the author’s right to 
life under article 6, paragraph 1, by deporting him to the United States, where he is under sentence of death, 
without ensuring that the death penalty would not be carried out.” (italics added). 
82 Supra., (note 74), Yin Fong v Australia, para. 9.7: “the Committee considers that an enforced return of the 
author to the Peoples' Republic of China, without adequate assurances, would constitute violations by Australia, 
as a State party which has abolished the death penalty, of the author's rights under article 6 and article 7 of the 
Covenant.” (emphasis added). 
83 Supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 535. 
84 United States v Burns, Judgment of 15 February 2001, Supreme Court, Canada, SCR 283, para. 73. 
85 Supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 550. 
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2.3.1. The Underlying Principle of Non-Facilitation  
In demonstrating that ECHR and ICCPR protection covers extradition cases, both the ECt 
and the HRC have relied on the principle of “non-facilitation” of the death penalty (and thus, 
similar to the concept of prohibition of complicity in convention-contrary conduct).  This 
results from a clear conflict if States were permitted to be instrumental in the foreseeable 
human rights abuses of other States.86 
In the ECHR context, one of the underlying rationales behind the ECtHR’s decision to 
prohibit extradition in these circumstances is the reality that the contracting State would be 
facilitating the unacceptable outcome,87 (i.e. facilitating the death penalty).    This was first 
established in Soering, where the ECtHR held that “liability [under the ECHR] is incurred by 
the extraditing Contracting State by reason of its having taken action which has a direct 
consequence the exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-treatment.”88   This underlying 
principle has subsequently been reaffirmed and endorsed by the ECtHR in a number of 
cases,89 and thus provided the rationale to broaden the protective ambit of the ECHR to 
prohibit extradition/expulsion from a contracting State to face the death penalty in a non-
contracting State. 
In another UK domestic case, R (Ismail) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,90 the 
UK Supreme Court concluded that the decision in Soering was based on the fact of UK’s 
facilitation of treatment contrary to ECHR Article 3 by the US: “It was because the actions of 
the UK authorities […] facilitated that outcome that a violation of article 3 was held to be 
                                                        
86 Sarfaraz Ahmed Khan, “Extradition and Death Penalty: An Unresolved Dilemma in Abolitionist States”, 
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015, p. 9. 
87 The Queen’s Bench in Maha Elgizouli accepted that the non-facilitation principle existed as the rationale to 
prohibit extradition in such circumstances, however, the Court did not accept that it could be extended to the 
provision of MLA, see supra., (note 8) Maha Elgizouli (QB case), paras. 66, 55.  
88 Supra., (note 51), Soering v UK, para. 91. 
89 See e.g. Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v UK, supra (note 37), para. 134;  Saadi v Italy, European Court of Human 
Rights, Judgment of 28 February 2008, Application No. 37201/06, para. 126;  Al-Adsani v the United Kingdom, 
European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 21 November 2001, Application No. 35763/97, para. 39. 
90 R (Ismali) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Judgment of 6 July 2016, Supreme Court, United 
Kindgom, WLR 2814.       Note – domestic cases do not provide significantly authoritative interpretations of 
international ECHR rights.  This domestic case is thus used only to highlight the existence and validity of the 
principle of non-facilitation. 
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present. In effect, the UK would have been directly instrumental to exposing Soering to the 
risk of being executed.”91 
The HRC has used the same rationale in its cases regarding extradition to face death penalty.  
For example, in Judge v Canada, the HRC found that Canada had violated the author’s right 
to life by extraditing him to the US to face the death penalty without obtaining requisite 
assurances: “The Committee recognizes that Canada did not itself impose the death penalty 
on the author. But by deporting him to a country where he was under sentence of death, 
Canada established the crucial link in the causal chain that would make possible the 
execution of the author.”92 
Another example from a national setting, which is relevant for this discussion, is a South 
African Constitutional Court Case, Mohamed v President of the Republic of South Africa.93   
In this case, the court looked at the causal connection to execution in extradition cases, and 
thus identified a principle of non-facilitation to justify refusing to extradite without 
appropriate death penalty assurances.  The court stated that there was a “commitment implicit 
in the Constitution that South Africa will not be party to the imposition of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading punishment”.94  The appellant used the language of the HRC in Judge v Canada, 
stating that what matters is whether the State has “established the crucial link in the chain that 
would make possible the execution of the author.”95 
Turning to the legal question of this study, the act of providing MLA for use in foreign 
criminal proceedings, where prosecution may result in judicial execution, clearly also has the 
direct consequence of exposing the individual in question to treatment prohibited for 
abolitionists States by the ECHR and the ICCPR.   The action of the authorities who provide 
or authorise the provision of MLA facilitates an outcome that contravenes ECHR and ICCPR 
rights to life and rights to be free from torture or inhumane treatment, as provision of such 
assistance is “directly instrumental” to exposing the individual in question to the risk of 
capital punishment. 
                                                        
91 Ibid., para. 35, Lord Kerr. 
92 Supra., (note 68), Judge v Canada, para. 10.6. (italics added) 
93 Mohammad and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, Judgment of 28 May 2001, 
Constitutional Court of South Africa, 17/01 [2001] ZACC 18.  Case also discussed by Lord Kerr in Maha 
Elgizouli SC case, supra., (note 9), para. 145. 
94 Ibid.,(Mohammad and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others), para. 59. 
95 Supra., (note 68), Judge v Canada, para. 10.6. 
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As discussed in the minority judgment of Lord Kerr in the Maha Elgizouli Supreme Court 
case, there is a “fundamental illogicality of, on the one hand, refusing to extradite or deport 
individuals for trial in a foreign state where there was a risk of the imposition of the death 
penalty, without requisite assurances, and, on the other hand, facilitating such a trial when 
precisely the same outcome is in prospect without demanding assurances.”96  The irrationality 
of taking a different approach in these two very similar circumstances is also illustrated by 
Christof Heyns (a former UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions, and current member of the HRC):  
“A dilemma emerges when abolitionist states provide assistance to retentionist states 
in criminal matters and that assistance leads to the use of the death penalty. Even 
though the individual facing the death penalty in such cases may never have been in 
the jurisdiction of the abolitionist state, such assistance could amount to complicity in 
the death penalty. The same legal principles apply here as in the case of transfer of 
persons: states that have abolished capital punishment may not assist in bringing 
about the death penalty in other countries.”97 
Thus, such rationale that prohibits extradition to face the death penalty, should not logically 
be confined only to extradition cases. “[I]f it is objectionable to be complicit in exposing an 
individual to the risk of execution by extraditing him, it is surely equally objectionable to be 
complicit in facilitating that result by providing material which has the same result.”98   
2.3.2. Opposition to the Death Penalty in “All Circumstances”: CoE and EU 
Member States 
As discussed earlier, ECHR Protocol 13 abolished the death penalty “in all circumstances” 
for its State parties. No derogations or reservations can be made from the absolute 
prohibition.99   The ECtHR’s discussion of the nature and extent of ECHR Protocol 13 in the 
case Alsaadoon v Mufhdi, is relevant for the argument that the non-facilitation principle 
extends to death penalty as a consequence of the provision of MLA: 
                                                        
96 Supra., (note 9), Maha Elgizouli (SC decision), Lord Kerr, para. 145(3).  Note, once more, Lord Kerr was in 
the minority. 
97 Special Rapporteur on extradition, summary or arbitrary executions, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, A/70/304, 7 August 2015, para. 102. 
98 Supra., (note 9), Maha Elgizouli (SC decision), Minority judgment of Lord Kerr, para. 145(3).  
99 ECHR Article 13, Articles 2 and 3. 
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“The court takes as its starting point the nature of the right not to be subjected to the 
death penalty. Judicial execution involves the deliberate and premeditated destruction 
of a human being by the state authorities. Whatever the method of execution, the 
extinction of life involves some physical pain. In addition, the foreknowledge of death 
at the hands of the state must inevitably give rise to intense psychological suffering. 
The fact that the imposition and use of the death penalty negates fundamental human 
rights has been recognised by the member states of the Council of Europe. In the 
preamble to Protocol No 13 the Contracting States describe themselves as ‘convinced 
that everyone’s right to life is a basic value in a democratic society and that the 
abolition of the death penalty is essential for the protection of this right and for the 
full recognition of the inherent dignity of all human beings’”100 
“The court considers that, in respect of those states which are bound by it, the right 
under article 1 of Protocol No 13 not to be subjected to the death penalty, which 
admits of no derogation and applies in all circumstances, ranks along with the rights 
in articles 2 and 3 as a fundamental right, enshrining one of the basic values of the 
democratic societies making up the Council of Europe. As such, its provisions must 
be strictly construed.”101 
The ECtHR’s discussion outlined above recognises the comprehensive reach of ECHR 
Protocol 13, whereby it applies in all circumstances, and no derogations or reservations are 
permitted.  Furthermore, the passage frames the prohibition of death penalty as a fundamental 
right (classing it alongside ECHR Articles 2 and 3).  ECtHR jurisprudence and ECHR 
Protocol 13 demonstrate “the almost complete ubiquity of opposition in the countries which 
compromise the Council of Europe to the imposition of the death penalty in any 
circumstances”.102   Furthermore, as noted earlier, the EU can also be argued to unmistakably 
oppose the death penalty in every circumstance.103   
The argument that the EU and CoE are strongly opposed to judicial execution, including 
indirect application of the death penalty, is supported by a Joint Declaration of the EU and 
CoE in 2018, which provides that: 
“On the European and World Day against the Death Penalty, the Council of Europe 
and the European Union (EU) reiterate their strong opposition to capital punishment 
in all circumstances and for all cases. The death penalty is an affront to human 
dignity. It constitutes cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and is contrary to the 
right to life. The death penalty has no established deterrent effect and it makes judicial 
errors irreversible […] Member states should continue taking effective measures to 
                                                        
100 Supra., (note 37), Alsaadoon v Mufhdi, para. 115. 
101 Ibid., para. 118. 
102 Supra., (note 9), Maha Elgizouli (SC decision), Lord Kerr, para. 116. 
103 See subheading 2.1. above. 
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prevent their involvement, however indirect, in the use of the death penalty by third 
countries, such as by adopting measures that prevent the trade in goods that could 
subsequently be used to carry out executions […]”104    
Thus, the CoE and EU Member State abhorrence to the death penalty, accompanied by the 
prohibition on facilitating death penalty through extradition, significantly support the 
argument that facilitating the same sentence through the provision MLA should also be 
prohibited for Member States of the CoE and the EU. 
2.3.3. Prohibition of Reintroduction of the Death Penalty 
Looking primarily at the ICCPR context, ICCPR OP 2 (like the ICCPR itself) “does not 
contain termination provisions and States parties cannot denounce it.”105   Thus, abolition of 
the death penalty cannot legally be revoked, and the death penalty may not be 
reintroduced.106 As provided by the HRC in General Comment 36: 
“[t]he obligation not to reintroduce the death penalty for any specific crime requires 
States parties not to deport, extradite or otherwise transfer an individual to a country 
in which he or she is expected to stand trial for a capital offence, if the same offence 
does not carry the death penalty in the removing State, unless credible and effective 
assurances against exposing the individual to the death penalty have been 
obtained.”107   
The facilitation of the death penalty in foreign States by abolitionist States in some respects 
reintroduces the abolished sentence for that State.  In the ICCPR context, this rationale was 
used to argue for the prohibition extradition to face the death penalty.  For example, in a 
minority judgment in the case Cox v Canada,108 (which was decided before ICCPR law 
developed to prohibit extradition to face the death penalty), the committee member argued 
that extradition would violate Article 7: 
“The argument was based on the presumption that abolitionist states are under 
obligation to ensure that the scope of the death penalty is not enlarged or 
                                                        
104 EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Secretary General of the Council of 
Europe, Joint Declaration on the European and World Day against the Death Penalty, published 9 October 
2018.  
105 Supra., (note 47), General Comment 36, para. 34.     
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Cox v Canada, Human Rights Committee, Views adopted 31 October 1994, Communication No. 539/1993. 
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reintroduced. The obligation extends to indirect reintroduction – through extradition, 
expulsion or compulsory return, in such a way that an individual […] may be exposed 
to capital punishment in another state.”109  
Thus, a similar argument can be forwarded for the topic of this study.  The provision of MLA 
in circumstances that may result in judicial execution enlarges the scope of the death penalty, 
effectively reintroducing it for the assistance-sending State, despite the irrevocable 
undertaking to prohibit and not reintroduce the death penalty. 
2.3.4. Evolutive Interpretation of the ECHR and the ICCPR 
2.3.4.1. Object and Purpose 
In justification of the expansion of ECHR protection to establish State party jurisdiction in 
extradition cases, the ECtHR has relied on interpreting the ECHR in light of its object and 
purpose.  The ECtHR has expanded the protective ambit of the ECHR in this way in the 
context of other rights also, relying on a purposive construction of ECHR rights.   In Soering, 
the ECtHR stated that “It would hardly be compatible with the underlying values of the 
Convention […] were a Contracting State knowingly to surrender a fugitive to another State 
where there were substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture, however heinous the crime allegedly committed. Extradition in such 
circumstances […] would plainly be contrary to the spirit and intendement of the 
[ECHR]”.110    
This is so in the ICCPR context also.  The object and purpose of the ICCPR is reflected in the 
text of the convention, as an instrument for the protection and recognition of human rights: 
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant […]”111   The HRC has also expanded protection to cover extradition cases, 
relying on the object and purpose of the ICCPR: “[The HRC] is moving towards 
strengthening the obligations of abolitionist states and, in so doing, restricting the availability 
                                                        
109 Supra., (note 46), Amrita Mukherjee, p. 515. 
110 Supra., (note 51), Soering v UK, para. 88. 
111 ICCPR, Article 2(1). 
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of the sanction [of the death penalty] for retentionist states. This is consistent with the object 
and purposes approach.”112 
Such reasoning is also valid for the provision of MLA in the circumstances of this study.  It 
would be equally inconsistent with the object and purpose of the ECHR and the ICCPR were 
abolitionist States permitted to provide MLA for use in criminal proceedings where 
prosecution may result in death penalty, when the death penalty is prohibited for those States.   
It would thus contravene the underlying values of the conventions if abolitionist State parties 
were permitted to facilitate death penalty in foreign States in this manner.   Provision of MLA 
in these circumstances would “plainly be contrary to the spirit and intendenment”113 of the 
ECHR and ICCPR (and their death penalty prohibiting additional protocols).       
2.3.4.2.  Convention Rights to be Practical and Effective 
From early on, the ECtHR has also emphasised the requirement that ECHR rights be 
“practical and effective” as opposed to “theoretical an illusory”. 114   This reasoning was also 
used by the ECtHR in its’ expansion of the ECHR’s extraterritorial applicability in 
extradition cases.  In Soering, the ECtHR provided that: “the object and purpose of the 
Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings require that its 
provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective.”115    
The ECHR is an instrument intended to be protect rights in a practical and effective manner.  
Prohibition of extradition to face the death penalty was thus required, to ensure that the 
safeguards codified in the ECHR were effective, not merely theoretical.   
The HRC has also highlighted the need for the practical and effective enjoyment of ICCPR 
rights, using the same wording as that used by the ECtHR.  For example, the case Kennedy v 
Trinidad and Tobago concerned, among other matters, the right of any one sentenced to 
death to seek pardon (within the Article 6 right to life).116  The HRC stated that: “the right to 
                                                        
112 Supra., (note 46), Amrita Mukherjee, p. 507. 
113 Supra., (note 51), Soering v UK, para. 88 
114 Airey v Ireland, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 9 October 1979, Application No. 6289/73, 
para 24. 
115 Supra., (note 51), Soering v UK, para. 87. 
116 ICCPR, Article 6(4). 
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apply for mercy under article 6, paragraph 4, must be interpreted to be an effective right, i.e. 
it must be construed in such a way that it is practical and effective rather than theoretical or 
illusory.”117   Thus, the ICCPR also obliges States to “ensure the effective and practical 
enjoyment of ICCPR rights.”118 
Turning to the question of the present study, in order for the right to life and the right to be 
free from torture or inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment to be “practical and 
effective”, State party facilitation of judicial execution (by way of provision of MLA in 
foreign criminal proceedings) must, surely, be prohibited by the ECHR and the ICCPR.   If 
provision of MLA under such circumstances were permissible, it would render aspects of 
ECHR and ICCPR safeguards ineffective and illusory. 
2.3.4.3.  Living Instruments 
Furthermore, the development of the ECHR and ICCPR prohibition of extradition to face the 
death penalty is an example of how both conventions are “living instruments”.   The HRC 
and the ECtHR have widened the scope of their respective conventions to cover subject 
matter that was not in the mind of the drafters, to reflect and respond to society’s 
contemporary views and needs.  This is because these conventions are living instruments and 
need to be “interpreted in light of present-day conditions”.119 
This doctrine has been used in the context of extradition to face convention-contrary 
treatment.  For example, in the aforementioned case, Judge v Canada, the HRC looked at the 
practice of its State parties (of seeking assurances before extraditing individuals to face 
capital charges): “[o]ther abolitionist countries do not, in general, extradite without 
                                                        
117 Kennedy v Trinidad and Tobago, Human Rights Committee, Views adopted 26 March 2002, Communication 
No. 845/1998, para. 3.7. 
118 Jeremy Farral and Kim Rubestein, Sanctions, Accountability and Governance in a Globalised World, 
Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 386. (italics added). 
119  First discussed in ECHR context in Tyrer v the United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, 
Judgment of 25 April 1978, Application No, 5856/72., para. 31.  For ICCPR, see also supra., (note 46), Amrita 
Mukherjee, e.g. at p. 507: “[The HRC] is moving towards strengthening the obligations of abolitionist states 
and, in so doing, restricting the availability of the sanction for retentionist states. This is consistent with […] the 
nature of the ICCPR as a living instrument.” (italics added) 
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assurances.”120   The HRC then came to the conclusion that Canada had violated the author’s 
right to life by extraditing him to the US to face the death penalty without obtaining requisite 
assurances, as the ICCPR had developed to reflect this legal reality: “The Committee 
considers that the Covenant should be interpreted as a living instrument and the rights 
protected under it should be applied in context and in the light of present–day conditions.”121 
This “living instrument” doctrine can be applied to the circumstances of the present study.  In 
doing so, the following statement by Lord Kerr in the Supreme Court judgment of Maha 
Elgizouli is relevant:  
“Law, [...] if it is operating as it should, must be responsive to society’s contemporary 
needs, standards and values. It is a commonplace that these are in a state of constant 
change. […] I am convinced that the adjustment to the common law which I propose 
[prohibiting the provision of MLA for proceedings which may result in death penalty] 
reflects the contemporary standards and values of our society.”122 
This study strongly agrees with Lord Kerr’s statement above.  Obliging States to withhold 
MLA in the absence of adequate death penalty assurances reflects the contemporary needs, 
standards and values of present day society (evidenced, for example, by the aforementioned 
parallels between providing MLA and the prohibition of extradition to face the death penalty, 
and, especially for the European context, the opposition of the CoE and EU to the death 
penalty).   This study submits that the evolution of the ECHR and the ICCPR to prohibit 
abolitionist States from providing such assistance without requisite assurances is merely an 
incremental step, and is inline with the status of both conventions as living instruments. 
2.4. ICCPR and ECHR State Parties 
As asserted in this chapter, the ICCPR and the ECHR may impose an obligation on 
abolitionist States to seek assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed before 
providing MLA for use in foreign criminal proceedings which may result in death penalty, 
and an obligation to withhold such assistance in the absence of adequate assurances.   With 
respect to which States such an obligation effects, as outlined in this chapter, it is likely that 
                                                        
120 Supra., (note 68), Judge v Canada, para. 10.3. 
121 Ibid., (italics added). 
122 Supra., (note 9), Maha Elgizouli (SC decision), Lord Kerr minority judgment, para. 144. 
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the law within the CoE human rights framework (i.e. through the ECHR) has developed so as 
to prohibit the death penalty for its member States in all circumstances,123 and that the ECHR 
now prohibits all contracting States from extraditing or expelling individuals to face the death 
penalty in retentionist States.124  Thus, the obligation to withhold assistance in the absence of 
death penalty assurances in the context of this study, would similarly apply to all ECHR 
contracting States.125 
For non-European/non-ECHR contracting States, those abolitionist States who have ratified 
the ICCPR would also be under a legal obligation to withhold MLA in the absence of 
requisite assurances in the context of this study.  As with extradition, this obligation would be 
so for all ICCPR State parties who have abolished the death penalty, not only for those 
abolitionist States who have ratified ICCPR OP 2.126       
States not party to ECHR or ICCPR, or ICCPR State parties who have not abolished the 
death penalty, would not be impacted by such international obligations stemming from these 
instruments.127     For those abolitionist States party to both the ICCPR and the ECHR, the 
more desirable complaints mechanism to bring such a case is the ECtHR.  The ECtHR is a 
judicial body that provides legally binding judgements,128 whereas the HRC is quasi-judicial, 
whereby its Views are recommendatory in nature (although still very authoritative).129 
  
                                                        
123 Supra., (note 37), Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v UK, para. 120. 
124 Ibid. 
125 And thus, all CoE member States (as ratification of ECHR is a pre-requisite for CoE membership). Council 
of Europe website, “A Convention to protect your rights and liberties”, available at 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/human-rights-convention, (last visited 31 March 2020). 
126 Supra., (note 68) Judge v Canada, para. 10.6: “For these reasons, the Committee considers that Canada, as a 
State party which has abolished the death penalty, irrespective of whether it has not yet ratified the Second 
Optional Protocol to the Covenant Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, violated the author’s right to 
life under article 6, paragraph 1, by deporting him to the United States, where he is under sentence of death, 
without ensuring that the death penalty would not be carried out.” (italics added). 
127 These States may, however, have similar obligations stemming from other instruments or domestic law.  This 
study does not analyse such potential obligations. 
128 ECHR, Article 46. 
129 See General Comment No. 33, Human Rights Committee, The Obligations on State Parties under the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/33, 5 
November 2008, para. 11: “While the function of the Human Rights Committee in considering individual 
communications is not, as such, that of a judicial body, the views issued by the Committee under the Optional 
Protocol exhibit some important characteristics of a judicial decision. They are arrived at in a judicial spirit, 
including the impartiality and independence of Committee members, the considered interpretation of the 
language of the Covenant, and the determinative character of the decisions.” 
Aliina Vegar 
 29 
3. The Issue of Jurisdiction 
Contracting States have a jurisdictionally qualified obligation to provide and protect the 
human rights codified in the ECHR and the ICCPR (i.e. the engagement undertaken by each 
State is confined to ensuring and protecting rights of those individuals within the State’s 
jurisdiction). 130    The provision of MLA in foreign criminal proceedings thus raises 
potentially difficult questions relating to jurisdiction, as the individual in question (who may 
be facing the death penalty) is not, and perhaps never was, in the territorial jurisdiction of the 
assistance-providing State.  
It is worth underscoring here, that the general rule is that ‘aliens’ are subject to the 
jurisdiction of the host state. 131   Thus, States exercising jurisdiction beyond their own 
territorial borders into another State’s territorial jurisdiction can actually be argued to 
interfere with the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of the host State. 132   However, the 
territorial jurisdiction of the host State is somewhat moderated by human rights obligations of 
other States, to the extent that they extend beyond national borders.   Thus, in the context of 
this study, in order to establish a duty on States to seek assurances, and withhold assistance in 
the absence of assurances, it must be established that State parties to the ECHR and the 
ICCPR owe, to some degree, extraterritorial obligations to the individuals to whom the 
foreign criminal proceedings concern.  This is a question of jurisdiction. 
An argument forwarded by Lorraine Finlay (regarding provision of MLA by Australia in 
potential death penalty cases) discusses the phrase “within the jurisdiction” of a State party, 
in reference to ICCPR OP 2.   She exemplifies how jurisdiction may present an obstacle for 
the conclusions presented in the previous Chapter: “The wording of this article places a clear 
and unambiguous jurisdictional limitation on the nature of the obligation. The article does not 
impose an obligation on States not to expose a person to the real risk of the application of the 
                                                        
130 See ECHR Article 1, ICCPR Article 2(1). 
131 Kay Hailbronner and Jana Gogolin, “Aliens”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford 
University Press, 2013;  Francesca Capone, “The children (and wives) of foreign ISIS fighters: Which 
obligations upon the states of nationality?”, in Questions of International Law Journal, Vol. 60, pp. 69-97, p. 
90. 
132 Ibid., Francesca Capone, pp. 69-97, p. 90. 
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death penalty. Rather, the language expressly limits the obligation to the abolition of the 
death penalty within the State's own jurisdiction.”133 
3.1. The Difference Between Extradition and MLA in Terms of Jurisdiction 
Although extradition to face the death penalty, and the provision of MLA for proceedings 
that may result in death penalty, have many obvious similarities (including the fact that both 
may facilitate judicial execution in a foreign state), they are not identical fact scenarios from 
a jurisdictional standpoint.    
Regarding extradition, the individual is, at least originally, within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the contracting State.   The presence of the individual within the territory of the contracting 
State means that an extraditing State has jurisdiction over the individual in question, owing to 
the obvious link between the contracting State’s physical territory and the individual whose 
rights are in question.   Thus, “[j]urisdiction extends in these [extradition] cases […] because 
the wrongful act […] is directly connected to the individual’s territorial presence in a 
signatory state”,134 and thus the State is responsible for the conditions on which it forces the 
individual to exit its borders.135 
This connection between the physical territory of the State party and extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in extradition cases is especially exemplified in pre-extradition/expulsion 
cases,136 as the individual is at all times within the contracting State’s physical territory, and 
the harm prospective.137   In reactive cases (where the contracting State has already expelled 
or extradited the individual), the jurisdictional responsibility under Article 1 is incurred upon 
the State party’s termination of territorial ties with the individual (which facilitates the 
ensuing ECHR-contrary action). 138    Thus, in both circumstances, the connection to the 
                                                        
133 Lorraine Finlay, “Exporting the Death Penalty? Reconciling International Police Cooperation and the 
Abolition of the Death Penalty in Australia, in Sydney Law Review, vol. 95, 2011, p. 109. (italics in original) 
134 Sarah Miller, “Revisiting extraterritorial jurisdiction: a territorial justification for extraterritorial jurisdiction”, 
in European Journal of International Law, Vol. 20(4), pp. 1123-1246, 2009, p. 1242. 
135 Ibid. 
136 E.g. Chahal v the United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 15 November 1996, 
Application No. 22414/93. 
137 Supra., (note 134), Sarah Miller, p. 1243.  
138 Ibid., p. 1243. 
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physical territory of the contracting party is clear, whereby it can be argued that “the 
extraterritorial acts are so foreseeably and inextricably linked to the individual’s [current or 
former] presence in the state’s territory that they become within the state’s jurisdiction.”139 
Conversely, regarding the provision of MLA for use in foreign criminal proceedings that may 
result in death penalty, the individual to whom the criminal investigation and proceeding 
concerns may have never stepped within the State party’s territorial borders.   The potential 
for absence of any past, present or future territorial ties with the MLA-providing State is a 
distinction between extradition and provision of MLA, which may make it more difficult to 
establish State party jurisdiction for the individual, when the adverse consequence is suffered 
outside its borders.   
The UK Queen’s Bench used similar arguments when they dismissed the claim in Maha 
Elgizouli.140   The Queen’s Bench found that the extension of jurisdiction (and of the non-
facilitation principle)141 to the provision of MLA under the circumstances of the case “is not 
[…] a small step, but an extension of a large moment which has not been recognised […] 
anywhere.”142  The Queen’s Bench stated that: “the claimant’s son is presently held in Syria, 
outside the jurisdiction of this court”, “the ECHR has no direct application to him”, and 
jurisdiction of the ECHR does not “stretch as far” as the individual to which the criminal 
proceedings concern.143 
3.2. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the ECHR and the ICCPR 
The ECHR and the ICCPR do have extraterritorial reach, to some degree.  However, “the 
extent to which State parties owe their human rights obligations abroad remains uncertain.”144   
Extensive case law and academic literature demonstrates that there is an ever-increasing 
extraterritorial scope under human rights conventions.145   
                                                        
139 Ibid., p. 1246. 
140 Note, on appeal, the Supreme Court was silent as to the matter of jurisdiction. See supra., (note 9), Maha 
Elgizouli (SC decision). 
141 Principle of non-facilitation of the death penalty, as assessed in Chapter 2. 
142 Supra., (note 8), Maha Elgizouli (QB decision), para. 66.       
143 Ibid., para. 55. 
144 Supra., (note 131), Fransesca Capone, p. 89. 
145 Supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 553. 
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As noted in Soering v the UK, the ECHR “does not govern the actions of States not Parties to 
it, nor does it purport to be a means of requiring the Contracting States to impose Convention 
standards on other States”.146   Despite this, it is clear that jurisdiction in the ECHR is no 
longer considered to simply be a territorial notion.147   The ECHR has extraterritorial reach, 
principally in two main categories: 1) circumstances where the State exerts effective control 
over an area outside its territory;148 and 2) circumstances where State agent(s) exercise power 
and control over an individual(s) (whereby the individual(s) thus falls within the jurisdiction 
of the State).149   As noted in Alskeini v UK,150 this includes the important exception to 
territorial jurisdiction – that a State has jurisdiction for acts committed extraterritorially, 
when it exercises  “public powers” on the territory of another State.151  As stated by Bharat 
Malkani, “[t]his illustrates a growing concern among the judiciary about the extraterritorial 
abuse of Convention rights.”152  
Turning to the ICCPR, similarly, the HRC “has long given extraterritorial effect to the 
ICCPR.”153   The most comprehensive statement of the extraterritorial reach of the ICCPR by 
the HRC was in its General Comment 31, where the HRC interpreted the obligation in Article 
2(1) as obliging State parties to “secure the rights under the Covenant for all persons in their 
territory and all persons under their control.” 154   The HRC went on to observe that a 
contracting party’s duty to respect, protect and ensure rights to all persons subject to the 
State’s jurisdiction includes “anyone within the power or effective control of the State Party, 
even if not situated in the territory of the State Party […]. This Principle also applies to those 
within the power or effective control of the forces of the State Party acting outside its 
territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective control was 
                                                        
146 Supra., (note 51), Soering v UK, para. 86. 
147 See e.g. Al Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 7 July 
2011, Application No. 55721/07. 
148 See e.g. Cyprus v Turkey, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 10 May 2001, Application No. 
25781/94. 
149 See e.g. Hassan v the United Kingdom, Judgment of 16 September 2014, Application No. 29750/09. 
150 Supra., (note 147), Al Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom, Note, this case added considerable clarity to 
the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction, e.g. classifying the headings noted in this paragraph, and what they 
contained. 
151 Ibid.    See also supra., (note 66), Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks and Clare Ovey, p. 93;     and supra., 
(note 1), Bharat Malkani, p 554.  
152 Supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 554. 
153 Robert Goldman, “Extraterritorial application of the rights to life and personal liberty including habeas 
corpus, during situations of armed conflict”, in Larissa Van Den Herik and Nico Schrijver (eds.) Counter-
terrorism strategies in a fragmented legal order: meeting the challenges, Cambridge University Press, pp. 454-
481, 2013, p. 457.  
154 Supra., (note 77), General Comment No. 31, para. 12. 
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obtained”. 155    The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) confirms this position in an 
Advisory Opinion of 2004,156 in which the ICJ rejected the argument that the ICCPR was not 
applicable outside a contracting State’s territorial boundary. 157    The ICJ stated that the 
ICCPR’s reach extends to “acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its 
own territory”.158   
3.3. Rationale to Draw Jurisdictional Link in This Context 
This study submits that, while the human rights framework analysed does not provide a 
straightforward jurisdictional link, it may be that existing categories of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in the ICCPR and ECHR can be further defined to include the context of this 
study. 
3.3.1. The Decision to Provide Assistance Occurs Within the State’s Territorial 
Jurisdiction 
As outlined above, human rights obligations codified in the ICCPR and the ECHR can 
extend, to some extent, beyond the State party’s territorial borders.  However, as yet, neither 
the ECtHR or HRC have analysed if the jurisdictional requirement can be satisfied in cases 
concerning the provision of MLA in criminal proceedings that may result in judicial 
execution, i.e. whether such circumstances “can be construed as the exercise of 'public 
powers' as per the ECHR, or whether the person at risk of the death penalty in these types of 
cases can be deemed to be 'within the power or effective control' of the abolitionist State as 
per the ICCPR.”159   
It can be argued that, in the circumstances of this study, the requirement of jurisdiction is 
satisfied as the act that leads to the wrong (i.e. the act of providing MLA without death 
                                                        
155 Ibid., para. 10. 
156 Legal consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion 
of the International Court of Justice, ICJ Rep 136, 9 July 2004. 
157 Supra., (note 153), Robert Goldman, p. 458. 
158 Supra., (note 156), ICJ Advisory Opinion, para. 111. 
159 Supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 554. 
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penalty assurances (and the act of deciding to do so)) occurs within the territory and effective 
control of the abolitionist State.160   Extradition cases are again of use for such an argument.  
As stated in the textbook Jacobs, White, and Ovey: The European Convention on Human 
Rights, in extradition cases under the ECHR, “liability under the Convention arises from the 
decision to remove the person concerned from the territory of the Contracting State and 
expose him to a risk of ill-treatment in the receiving country.  The Contracting State is not 
liable for what actually befalls the applicant once out of its territory […], but instead for 
making the decision to expel him knowing that there was such a risk.”161    Similarly, the 
argument could be forwarded here, that liability under the ECHR occurs at the point of the 
decision (which is made in the abolitionist State’s physical territory) to provide MLA without 
requisite assurances, which thus exposes the person concerned to a risk of ill treatment in the 
assistance-receiving State.  However, as discussed in paragraph 3.1. above, there are factual 
differences between extradition and provision of MLA which may be fatal to such an 
argument (notably, the presence of the individual concerned in the territorial jurisdiction of 
the abolitionist State).  
3.3.2. Individual is within “the Power and Control” of the Abolitionist State, and 
the Abolitionist State is Exercising “Public Powers”  
However, there is definitely room to argue that in cases such as Maha Elgizouli, the State is 
exercising power and control over the individual concerned, despite the individual not being 
present in the State’s territorial borders, thus bringing the individual in question under the 
jurisdiction of the abolitionist State.   In the fact scenario of Maha Elgizouli, Mr El Sheikh (to 
whom the proceedings concern) was a British citizen until the UK recently stripped him of 
his citizenship.  The UK has expressed desire to try him in its own territory, however, the 
UK’s Crown Prosecution Service had determined that the evidence available was insufficient 
to warrant charging him in its territory.162  As the UK considered it infeasible to prosecute 
him in the UK, it decided to support prosecution of El Sheikh in the US instead: “the clear 
view of the UK officials was that a prosecution of Mr El Sheikh in the US federal court 
                                                        
160 Ibid., pp. 533-534. 
161 Supra., (note 66), Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks and Clare Ovey, p. 90. (italics added). 
162 Supra., (note 9), Maha Elgizouli (SC decision), para. 32.  Note, feasibility of trying him in the UK may be 
revisited in the future (para. 32). 
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system, which included the UK evidence, represented the only realistic prospect of securing 
justice”.163   This is despite the US being rather reluctant to take responsibility for the trial, 
where the US “considered that the UK ought to set an example to the wider international 
community by accepting responsibility for bringing foreign terrorist fighters such as Mr El 
Sheikh […] to trial.”164  Any prosecution of El Sheikh in the US “depends critically on the 
evidence which has been obtained by the British authorities”.165   
This fact scenario shows an undeniable link between Mr El Sheikh and the UK.  The US is, 
more or less, trying El Sheikh on the UK’s behalf, as the evidence available was considered 
insufficient to try him within the UK domestic judicial system.  Furthermore, the trial 
depends significantly on UK evidence, whereby the absence of UK’s evidence renders 
prosecution in the US is unlikely to succeed.  In these circumstances, it is a flagrant denial of 
fact to claim that El Sheikh, and the consequence of death penalty that may befall him, are 
not inextricably connected to the UK.  The UK is exercising public powers in the US through 
this case, and exercising power and control over El Sheikh.  As stated in Al-Skeini, “What is 
decisive in such cases is the exercise of […] power and control over the person in 
question.”166   The power and control that the UK is exercising over El Sheik thus provides 
sound argument for drawing a jurisdiction link.  Such an argument is supported by the fact 
that the UK Supreme Court raised no jurisdictional arguments in the case (while in the 
Queen’s Bench decision, jurisdiction was a significant factor for denying the applicability of 
ECHR obligations).167    
As stated by Robert Currie, in such cases “[i]t is arguable that the provision of MLA by the 
requested State is an act of authority producing effects extraterritorially. The authorities are 
certainly exercising jurisdiction over the essential legal interests of the person regardless of 
their physical location.”168    While a specific jurisdictional conclusion to this effect is yet to 
be drawn by the ECtHR or the HRC, this study submits that this is because such a case has 
not appeared before either body.  As stated in Jacobs, White, and Ovey: The European 
                                                        
163 Ibid., para. 33.   
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Supra., (note 147), Alskeini v UK, para. 136. 
167 See supra., (note 9), Maha Elgizouli (SC decision).   Note, even Lord Kerr’s judgment in favour of 
broadening the principle of non-facilitation to provision of MLA was silent as to jurisdiction, suggesting that 
jurisdiction presented no obstacle in his reasoning. 
168 Supra., (note 3), Robert Currie, (page number unknown – no page numbers provided in SSRN version of text 
download). 
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Convention on Human Rights, “still further development of the definition of jurisdiction will 
be necessary in future cases, particularly given the ever increasing involvement in 
Contracting States in conflicts beyond there territorial borders.”169  
3.3.3. Jurisdictional Limits Need Not Be Determinative 
It can also be argued that “the developing law on the scope of extraterritorial obligations 
under human rights treaties suggests that the issue of jurisdictional limits need not be 
determinative of the scope of abolitionist States' secondary obligations to refrain from 
facilitating the use of the death penalty elsewhere.”170    This is exemplified by Robert Currie 
in his discussion on one State providing evidence to another for use in an unfair trial: “To 
provide evidence for use in a foreign criminal procedure that amounts to a "flagrant denial" 
of fair trial rights, simply on the basis that "our human rights obligations don't cover the 
accused," may render the requested State complicit in conduct which it has agreed to prohibit, 
necessarily leaving a bad taste from a legal and moral standpoint.”171     
The same argument can be forwarded in the context of this study also – where an abolitionist 
State is knowingly facilitating conduct that it has legally bound itself to abstain from (i.e. the 
death penalty), and chooses not to take steps to prevent it merely because of a jurisdictional 
technicality, this leaves a questionable aftertaste.172  Through the provision of MLA, the 
assisting-State is participating in an invasive form of interaction between State and 
individual, directly impacting the person’s legal interests.173    As such, the State should act in 
accordance with its own human rights obligations, and not dispose of such obligations on a 
mere technicality. 
  
                                                        
169 Supra., (note 66), Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks and Clare Ovey, p. 96. 
170 Supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 555. 
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4. State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
The law on state responsibility is outlined in the International Law Commission’s (“ILC”) 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (“ILC Articles” / 
“Articles on State Responsibility”). 174   This is another requirement which needs to be 
convincingly argued in order to establish abolitionist State responsibility for providing MLA 
to death penalty retentionist States for use in criminal proceedings that may result in the death 
penalty.175   
As referred to in “Method and Material” 176  and “Limitations”, 177  the legal status of the 
Articles on State Responsibility is unresolved in the legal community.  While this thesis will 
not delve into discussion regarding the legal status of the ILC Articles, the position adopted 
in this study is that they are highly authoritative in nature, and evidence of a source of law. 
4.1. Abolitionist State Responsibility for an Internationally Wrongful Act 
Article 1 of the ILC Articles concisely provides that, “Every internationally wrongful act of a 
State entails the international responsibility of that State”.178   Article 2 goes on to define the 
conditions required to establish the existence of an internationally wrongful act, that being: 1) 
the conduct (consisting of an action or omission) must be attributable to the State under 
international law; and 2) for responsibility to be established, the conduct must constitute a 
                                                        
174 The Articles on State Responsibility  (“ILC Articles”) are annexed to Resolution 56/83, adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/56/83, Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, 12 
December 2001;     The ICL’s Articles themselves: International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its 
Fifty-third Session, UN Doc. A/56/10, 2001/283 (herein “ILC Articles” / “Articles on State Responsibility”); 
For the final text with commentary and apparatus, see supra., (note 25), James Crawford. 
175 Note, however, that the ECtHR and the HRC frequently fail to mention the ILC Articles in their 
jurisprudence, often following their own rules regarding the responsibility of States (even though the ILC 
Articles should be relevant for their decisions). This will not be further discussed in the present study, but for 
further discussion, see e.g. Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Dan Sarooshi, Issues of State Responsibility before 
International Judicial Institutions: The Clifford Chance Lectures, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2004, p. 167: “The 
ILC Articles are virtually never explicitly mentioned in HRC discussions or for that matter in those of other 
human rights treaty organs.”     For ECtHR specifically, see e.g. James Crawford and Amelia Keene, “The 
Structure of State Responsibility under the European Convention on Human Rights”, in Anne van Aaaken and 
Iulia Motoc (Eds.), The European Convention on Human Rights and General International Law, pp. 178-197, 
Oxford Scholarship Online, 2018.  
176 See “Methods and Material”, subheading 1.3. of this study. 
177 See “Limitations”, subheading 1.4. of this study. 
178 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Article 1. 
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breach of an international obligation of the State.179  “[B]oth elements are equally necessary 
for the attachment of concrete consequences of responsibility.”180 
4.1.1. Attribution 
As referred to above, for conduct to be characterised as an “internationally wrongful act”, it 
must first be attributable to the State in question.181   While States are legal persons with 
authority to act under international law,182 the elementary fact is that States have no physical 
existence, and thus can only act through person(s) whose conduct is performed on the States 
behalf: 183  “States can act only by and through their agents and representatives.” 184   
Actions/omissions of persons acting on behalf of the State are attributable to the State, and 
thus considered to be actions of the State itself.   
In the ILC Articles, Chapter II of Part 1 deals with the question of attribution.  Article 4 
provides that conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of the State (whether 
exercising legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions), and an organ includes any 
person/entity that has status in accordance with the State’s internal law.185    International 
lawyers and academics disagree on precisely who is a State agent for attribution purposes, but 
they do agree that a State must have substantial control over an individual in order for the 
person to be considered the State’s agent.186  
Decisions to provide MLA are clearly attributable to the State, as the persons making 
decisions to provide MLA are linked to the State’s executive government, as public State 
entities.   For example, in the aforementioned case, Maha Elgizouli, the UK Home Secretary 
                                                        
179 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Article 2(a)-(b). 
180 Supra., (note 21), Robert Kolb, p. 34. 
181 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Article 2(a).   See also ILC Commentary on Article 2 – International 
Law Commission, Commentary to Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in 
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN Doc. A/56/10, 
2001/283, para. 5 (herein “ILC Commentary”).  See also Supra., (note 25), James Crawford, p. 82. 
182 ILC Commentary on Article 2, para. 5.  See also, Supra., (note 25), James Crawford, p. 82. 
183 Supra., (note 21), Robert Kolb, p. 70. 
184 Questions relating to settlers of German origin in Poland, Advisory Opinion of the International Court of 
Justice, P.C.I.J., Series B, no. 6, 1923, p. 22.  
185 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Article 4(1)-(2). 
186 Monica Hakimi, “State bystander responsibility”, The European Journal of International Law, vol. 21(2), pp. 
341-385, 2010, p. 356. 
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(a Cabinet Minister for the UK government), authorised provision of MLA to the US.  While 
the specific governmental entity in charge of making MLA decisions may vary between 
States, the decisions always come from governmental offices and agents.  Thus, it can be 
clearly established that any decision making act connected provision of MLA is attributable 
to the State under international law, thus satisfying Article 2(a) of the ILC Articles. 
4.1.2. Breach of an International Obligation  
As noted above, the second requirement for the existence of an internationally wrongful act is 
that the conduct attributable to the State constitutes a breach of an international obligation of 
the State.187   What is required is discrepancy between a normative obligation on the one 
hand, and the actual conduct on the other: “[t]here is a breach of an international obligation 
by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that 
obligation, regardless of its origin or character.”188   “[R]egardless of its origin or character” 
refers to the applicability of all international legal obligations of States: “[i]nternational 
obligations may be established by a customary rule of international law, by a treaty or by a 
general principle applicable within the international legal order.”189   A relevant primary 
obligation incumbent on the State must therefore be established, and then it must be shown 
that the State’s actual conduct did not conform to what was legally required of it.     
Regarding the provision of MLA, the question then turns to the topic of Chapter 2, i.e. 
whether there exists a legal obligation on abolitionist States to obtain death penalty 
assurances before the State provides MLA for use in a foreign criminal proceeding that may 
result in death penalty, and/or an obligation to withhold MLA in the absence of such 
assurances.   As conduct proscribed by an international obligation may involve acts and 
omissions,190 or a combination of acts and omissions, the specific formulation as a positive 
obligation to obtain assurances, or a negative obligation to refrain from providing MLA in the 
absence of assurances, is immaterial. 
                                                        
187 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Article 2(b). 
188 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Article 12. 
189 ILC Commentary on Article 12, para. 3. See also supra., (note 25); James Crawford, p.126. 
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As established in the preceding chapters, the legal obligation discussed would require 
abolitionist States to do more than merely refrain from imposing the death penalty.   Rather, 
there would also exist a legal obligation not to facilitate the use of the death penalty in 
foreign States through the provision of MLA in such circumstances.  Chapter 2 of this study 
concluded that such an obligation can, perhaps, be read into existing treaty law: thus 
prohibiting abolitionist States from providing MLA to death penalty retentionist States for 
use in criminal proceedings that may result in the death penalty, without having first obtained 
death penalty assurances.  Therefore, there is a possibility that such an international 
obligation can be established.  
On this view, if an abolitionist State were to provide MLA to a retentionist State for use in a 
criminal proceeding which may result in the death penalty, without having obtained death 
penalty assurances, the State’s conduct would not be in conformity with what is required of it 
by the aforementioned international obligation. Thus, the second condition required to 
establish an internationally wrongful act as provided by Article 2(b) of the ILC Articles 
would also be satisfied, as the abolitionist State would be in breach of an international 
obligation.   
4.2.   Potential Problems  
However, as outlined in the preceding chapter, jurisdictional limits to human rights 
obligations may present an obstacle to finding an obligation in the context of this study.  “A 
state […] owes no obligations to persons beyond its ‘jurisdiction’, and cannot incur direct 
responsibility should that person suffer from a rights violation.”191   If it was found that a 
jurisdictional link did not exist, then the provision of MLA without death penalty assurances 
may not breach any international obligation per se, in which case there would be no 
“internationally wrongful act” as defined in the ILC Articles (and thus not igniting the 
international responsibility of the abolitionist State). 
                                                        
191 Hugh King, “The extraterritorial human rights obligations of states”, in Human Rights Law review, Vol. 9(4), 
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Aliina Vegar 
 41 
In the same line, it may be forwarded that the obligation to obtain death penalty assurances 
before providing MLA in the circumstances of this study is thus a political obligation, rather 
than a legal one.   This may introduce problems with finding responsibility of the abolitionist 
State, as “responsibility only attaches to the breach of legal obligations.”192  When a State 
assumes a political obligation, they may incur political reprobation in the event of a breach, 
but they will not incur legal State responsibility in the sense presented in this chapter.  
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5. State Responsibility for Complicity in an Internationally Wrongful Act 
If jurisdictional limits ultimately impede the establishment of an international obligation in 
the context of this study, it would mean that that failure to obtain death penalty assurances 
would not attract the primary responsibility of the abolitionist State.  However, the ILC 
Articles on State Responsibility provide another potential avenue, whereby the derivative 
responsibility of the abolitionist State may be established on the same facts. 
Article 16 of the ILC Articles deals with the situation where one State assists in the 
commission of internationally wrongful act of another State.   Article 16 provides that: where 
a State aids/assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the 
latter State, the aiding State is internationally responsible for doing so if 1) the State does so 
with the knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and 2) the act 
would be internationally wrongful if committed by the aiding State.193   
5.1. Complicity 
The concept of “complicity” is contentious, both in terms of formulation of legal doctrine, 
and in individual cases (domestically and internationally).194   In the drafting of Article 16, 
the ILC discarded the term “complicity” for the more neutral sounding concept of “aid or 
assistance” of the ILC Articles.195  However, courts and academic theorists alike frequently 
use the terms interchangeably.  This study adopts the term “complicity” for the situations 
covered by Article 16 of the ILC Articles, principally for the convenience of not needing to 
refer each time to the phrase “aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act”.  
Furthermore, although the term “complicity” originally stems from criminal law, the meaning 
and the elements of the concept differ in the State responsibility arena.  Standards for 
accomplice responsibility vary in the various frameworks in which complicity (or aiding and 
                                                        
193 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Article 16. 
194 Jamie Gaskarth, “Entangling alliances? The UK's complicity in torture in the global war on terrorism”, 
International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs, vol. 87(4), pp. 945-964, 2011, p. 946. 
195 George Nolte and Helmut Aust, “Complicit States, mixed messages at international law”, The International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 58(1), pp. 1-30, 2009, p. 5. 
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abetting) is considered, for example in domestic tort law, international and domestic criminal 
law and in the law of non-contractual obligations. 196   Thus, this study reminds that 
interdisciplinary comparisons have limited usefulness, as complicity in each of these 
frameworks has independent meaning.   This study thus seeks to establish the meaning of 
complicity (i.e. “aid or assistance in an internationally wrongful act”) in the normative 
framework of Article 16 of the ILC Articles and in the human rights framework of the 
ICCPR and the ECHR, to ascertain if abolitionist States can be considered “complicit” in the 
death penalty through provision of MLA without requisite assurances. 
5.2. The Limited Scope of Article 16 
By the text of the provision, it is alluring to use Article 16 of the ILC Articles to argue that an 
abolitionist State attracts derivative State responsibility if, through providing MLA, it were to 
assist judicial execution in a foreign State.  In principle, the assistance provided may be 
vitally important in the criminal proceeding (as in Maha Elgizouli), and thus make imposing 
the death penalty possible.  Therefore, a clear causal/enabling connection can often be made 
between the MLA provided without having obtained death penalty assurances, and the 
imposition of a death penalty sentence.197   However, the ILC Commentary to the Articles on 
State Responsibility limits the scope of Article 16 in a number of ways.   Depending on the 
specific circumstances, some of these limitations can be rather easily resolved, while others 
may be fatal to the claim.    
5.2.1. Easily Resolved Limitations 
The ILC Commentary provides that the relevant State organ providing assistance (here, the 
State organ providing MLA) must be aware of the circumstances making the conduct 
internationally wrongful.198   This may be relatively easily resolved of present purposes, as 
abolitionist States are aware that it is internationally wrongful if they were themselves to 
                                                        
196 Helmut Aust, Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 194. 
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subject individuals to the death penalty. Furthermore, inline with paragraph 4 of the ILC 
Commentary on Article 16, the abolitionist State is very likely to be “[…]aware of the 
circumstances in which its aid or assistance is intended to be used by the other State”,199 (i.e. 
that the MLA will be used in a criminal proceeding that may result in the death penalty).  
Therefore, it is likely that this first limitation can be easily resolved in the case at hand. 
This leads to the other easily resolvable limitation provided in the ILC Commentary: that the 
completed act must be such that it would have been wrongful had it been committed by the 
assisting State itself.200  This is also easy to satisfy for present purposes: States that have 
ratified a treaty prohibiting imposition of the death penalty would fulfil this element if they 
were to impose the death penalty.201  Thus, this would encompass abolitionist States party to 
the ECHR and/or the ICCPR. 
5.2.2. The Subjective Element – Intent or Knowledge? 
The Commentary to the ILC Articles also provides that the aid/assistance must be given 
“with a view of facilitating the commission of that act.” 202   The ILC elaborates on this, 
stating that the aiding State will not be responsible under Article 16 unless 1) the State organ 
concerned intended, by the assistance given, to facilitate the occurrence of the wrongful 
conduct; and 2) that the wrongful conduct actually occurred.203   
This presents two problems.   First, “[i]t is hardly ever the case […] that abolitionist States 
directly intend to bring about the death penalty through their conduct.”204   Second, the act 
(the death penalty, or a death penalty sentence) would actually have to occur.  Thus, if 
responsibility ensued, it would do so only upon the death penalty sentence being imposed 
(not upon the act of providing MLA without having obtained death penalty assurances), as 
“there is no such concept as an attempted internationally wrongful act.”205 
                                                        
199 ILC Commentary on Article 16, para. 3. See also, Supra., (note 25), James Crawford, p. 149. 
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Regarding the first problem, the ILC Commentary thus suggests that the abolitionist State, 
through providing MLA, intended to facilitate or contribute to the imposition of the death 
penalty.   On this reading, knowledge of the activities of the other State is insufficient, it must 
be established that the MLA is supplied for the purpose of assisting the foreign State in the 
commission of the death penalty.206   However, in almost all cases this would very difficult to 
prove.  In the context of this study, States may always argue that they are not specifically 
intending to facilitate the death penalty by providing MLA, they are intending to assist in the 
criminal proceeding (regardless of sentencing outcome).  Thus, on a strict reading, complicity 
per Article 16 could fail at this level. 
However, there is disagreement about the precise scope of the subjective element of 
complicity in Article 16.   As Article 16 may not in and of itself be determinative of the issue 
of complicity, 207  arguments have been forwarded to question if “intent” is actually 
required.208   One such argument is that “intent” has not been explicitly adopted into the 
language of Article 16, it is only mentioned in the ILC commentary, despite the original draft 
Article on complicity (then, Article 27) explicitly containing the word “intention”. 209    
Further, upon amendment, ILC members themselves were uncertain whether the new Article 
16 required intent, or just knowledge that the assisted State will or may use the assistance to 
commit an internationally wrongful act.    This can be seen in the following statement from 
the Report from the ILC’s Fifty-First Session:  
“Questions were also raised with respect to the meaning of the phrase “with 
knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act”. Did it mean that 
the assisting State must have the intention of facilitating the commission of the 
internationally wrongful act, or was it sufficient that it had knowledge of the fact that 
the assisted State would use the aid or assistance to commit an internationally 
wrongful act? What should be done about cases of uncertainty, e.g., where there was a 
risk that the assisted State would so act, but it was not certain?”210  
                                                        
206 Bernhard Graefrath, “Complicity in the law of international responsibility”, Revue Belge De Droit 
International, vol. 29(2), pp. 370-380, 1996, p. 376. 
207 See subheading 5.3. of this study, “Lex Specialis” 
208 For comprehensive discussion of arguments questioning requirement of complicity, see Kate Nahapetian, 
“Confronting state complicity in international law”, UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, 
vol.7(1), pp. 99-128, 2002. 
209 Ibid., p. 107. 
210 International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Fifty-
First Session (3 May-23 July 1999), UN. Doc. A/54/10, para. 258.  See also Supra., (note 208), Kate 
Nahapetian, p. 107. 
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Furthermore, it has been argued that the object and purpose of Article 16 would be defeated 
by an intent requirement. 211    It goes without saying that it is problematic to establish 
psychological elements of States, insofar as a State does not have its own “will” in the sense 
that individuals do.212   Further, the need to prove that the State supplying assistance wanted 
to support the wrongful act is a very stringent test.   Thus, “it seems highly questionable that 
such a narrow interpretation of intent as a decisive criterion for complicity is really useful”,213 
as it may render the whole notion of complicity at international law unworkable.  If intent is 
required, “liability will only be found in the most limited of instances where a country makes 
clear its intentions to facilitate human rights abuses. Countries will rarely declare these 
intentions, and meeting the intent requirement without these declarations will prove near 
impossible.”214   The intent requirement has thus been heavily criticised by commentators, as 
it makes it easy for assisting States to evade accountability: “the inclusion of the intent 
requirement […] would prevent punishing countries that enabled human rights abuses simply 
because they did not intend such a result, although they were fully aware of it.”215   
Due to the above, it is argued here that the intent requirement is not required to ascertain 
complicity in this context.  While intent may not be required, “there is near unanimity in the 
literature that responsibility under Article 16 [of the ILC Articles] requires some subjective 
relationship between the assisting State and the commission of the wrongful act by the main 
actor.”216   Discussions on complicity in torture by the UK Joint Committee on Human Rights 
(“JCHR”) provide relevant comments here, suggesting that the assisting State’s knowledge of 
the real and imminent risk that the aid provided might assist the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act is sufficient to satisfy the subjective element of complicity.  For 
example, in the JCHR’s report regarding allegations of UK complicity in torture, the JCHR 
noted that complicity in torture “means simply one State giving assistance to another State in 
the commission of torture, or acquiescing in such torture, in the knowledge, including 
constructive knowledge, of the circumstances of the torture which is or has been taking 
place”.217    Thus, the JCHR does not refer to “intention” as a requirement for complicity, 
                                                        
211 Supra., (note 208), Kate Nahapetian, p. 126. 
212 Ibid., p. 241.  Note, proving subjective intent or knowledge in individuals also presents significant problems. 
213  Ibid. 
214 Supra., (note 208), Kate Nahapetian, p. 110. 
215 Ibid.  
216 Supra., (note 196), Helmut Aust, p. 231. 
217 Joint Committee on Human Rights (“JCHR”), Twenty-Third Report of 2008-09: Allegations of UK 
Complicity in Torture, HL 152, HC 230, 21 July 2009, available at: 
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rather it considers knowledge of the real and imminent risk of torture, including constructive 
knowledge, to suffice.218   The extradition cases discussed in Chapter 2 also suggest that 
proof of intent in not required, whereby “the responsibility of the sending state is not based 
on intent but solely on actual or even constructive knowledge”219 of the risk in the foreign 
State for the individual in question.220  
Due to the above arguments, this study submits that abolitionist States can incur 
responsibility for aiding imposition of the death penalty by foreign States, even when they do 
not directly intend their assistance to do so.  It is enough that such States knew (or ought to 
have known) that the provision of MLA might facilitate the use of the death penalty.221   In 
the case of provision of MLA without obtaining death penalty assurances, it is clear that upon 
MLA request, States are made aware of the circumstances of the criminal trial, aware of 
which crimes are punishable by death in the MLA-receiving State, and thus aware that 
provision of MLA in the prosecution may, by consequence, assist the use of capital 
punishment in the foreign State.   The State’s knowledge that its conduct may assist use of 
the death penalty can generally be inferred from the circumstances and from its actions (for 
example, from information provided by the MLA-seeking State in the MLA request, from 
observation that an individual is indicted on capital charges, from documentation of the 
abolitionist State contemplating whether or not to seek death penalty assurances, or death 
penalty assurance requests that have been refused by the MLA-receiving State).  For 
example, in Maha Elgizouli, UK’s knowledge that it may facilitate use of the death penalty 
through its provision of MLA can be construed from the fact that it sought death penalty 
assurances in the first instance (as it was aware of the risk of death penalty), and then, upon 
US refusal to provide such assurances, the UK provided the requested MLA, despite the risk 
of judicial execution. This study submits that in such circumstances, regardless of whether or 
not the UK intended to facilitate the death penalty, the UK’s unquestionable knowledge that 
the provision of MLA under these circumstances could facilitate the death penalty equates to 
a sufficient subjective element to satisfy Article 16. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
http:/www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200809/jtselect/jtrights/152/15202.htm (last visited 6 April 2020), 
para. 35.    See also supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 530. 
218 Supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 531. 
219 Aristoteles Constantinides, “Extradition”, in André Nollkaemper, Ilias Plakokefalos, Jessica Schechinger and 
Jann Kleffner (Eds.) The Practice of Shared Responsibility in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
pp. 128-161, 2017, p. 150. 
220 Regarding conceptual differences between extradition/non-refoulement cases and complicity, see subheading 
5.6. of this study.  
221 Supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 531. 
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5.2.3. Internationally Wrongful Act of the Committing State 
Another problematic criterion of Article 16 is that responsibility only arises where a State 
voluntarily assists another State “in carrying out conduct which violates the international 
obligations of the latter.”222    Thus, the State committing the allegedly wrongful act must be 
legally prohibited from doing so.223    This is problematic, as the State in which the criminal 
proceeding (and thus death penalty) is occurring is a death penalty retentionist State, and thus 
very unlikely to have legally bound itself to prohibit the death penalty in its jurisdiction.    It 
is only those States who are parties to treaties that prohibit judicial execution that would be 
committing an internationally wrongful act by imposing such a sanction, not a State who has 
taken on no such obligation at international law.   
This presents a problem for cases such as the aforementioned Maha Elgizouli, as the US, for 
example, is not party to a treaty prohibiting the death penalty, and nor is there a general rule 
of international law prohibiting the death penalty.224   Thus, lending to the wording in Article 
16, responsibility of the abolitionist State for complicity in an internationally wrongful act is 
not possible, as the retentionist State itself is not committing an internationally wrongful act 
by submitting an offender to the death penalty.  
                                                        
222 ILC Commentary to Article 16, para. 1. See also, Supra., (note 25), James Crawford, p. 148.  This can be 
seen directly in the wording of Article 16 itself: the State assists “in the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act by the latter […]” (italics added). 
223 Supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 527. 
224 Note, however, there is a continued trend in international law and in State practice towards prohibition of the 
death penalty. Very few States are expanding or introducing the use of the death penalty, and thus some argue 
there is a global trend toward abolition, and also a general rule of international law prohibiting the death penalty 
developing.  See e.g. Supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 527; William Schabas, The Abolition of the Death 
Penalty in International Law, vol. 3, Cambridge University Press, 2003; Roger Hood, The Death Penalty: A 
Worldwide Perspective, vol. 4, Oxford, 2008.      See also supra., (note 9), Maha Elgizouli (SC decision , Lord 
Kerr at para. 148: “In his intervention in this case Professor Heyns suggested that “there is an emerging norm of 
customary international law that the death penalty as such is a violation of the absolute right against torture and 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of punishment, and that a norm against the facilitation of the death 
penalty follows from that.””;    See also, Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment: Note by the Secretary General, A/67/279, 9 August 2012: “there is an 
evolving standard whereby states and judiciaries consider the death penalty to be a violation per se of the 
prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment … The Special Rapporteur is convinced that a 
customary norm prohibiting the death penalty under all circumstances, if it has not already emerged, is at least 
in the process of formation.”;    Furthermore, as noted in supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p.527, there are some 
general rules of international law governing use of the death penalty – for example prohibition of the death 
penalty for minors (under 18 years old).  Thus, if a retentionist State were to impose the death penalty on such 
an individual, an MLA providing State would incur responsibility per Article 16. 
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5.3. Lex Specialis 
However, as referred to earlier, Article 16 may not be determinative of the issue.   Article 16 
may be “remedied by resort to primary rules that take precedence as lex specialis”,225 as 
provided by Article 55 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility.   Article 55 provides that 
the ILC Articles “do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of 
an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international 
responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of international law.”226   
As it remains to be determined if Article 16 is a proper articulation of the concept of 
complicity, the Article can be superseded by the lex specialis on complicity in this context, if 
such primary rules are found to exist.227   Assessment and interpretation is therefore required 
to determine what complicity means in the framework of primary (i.e. special) rules of 
international law, to enable proper interpretation of Article 16 in the context of State 
complicity in the use of the death penalty. 
Chapter 2 of this study also significantly discusses abolitionist State facilitation of the death 
penalty from a human rights perspective.  This study intends for the reader contemplate the 
subject matter of these two parts in unison, in the formation of the lex specialis on complicity 
in death penalty. 
5.4. The Primary Rules of Complicity in the Death Penalty  
The main duty for abolitionist States is simply to refrain from imposing the death penalty 
within their jurisdiction.   However, as discussed throughout this study, it is possible that 
there also a secondary obligation, to refrain from aiding or assisting in the death penalty 
elsewhere.   The foundation of the concept of “complicity” is a finding of responsibility of 
one State on the basis of another State’s actions, which is justified by the secondary State’s 
contribution to the act committed.   
                                                        
225 Supra., (note 219), Aristoteles Constantinides, p. 147. 
226 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Article 55. 
227 Supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 528.  Note, there is also discussion that Article 16 is customary – see e.g. 
the ICJ referring to Article 16 as reflecting a “customary rule” in Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), 
International Court of Justice, Judgment of 26 February 2007, ICJ Reports 43[420]. 
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The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (“UNODC”) has recognised that through its work, there 
is potential for it to be complicit in the death penalty.  In a 2012 position paper, UNODC 
provided that “If […] a country actively continues to apply the death penalty for drug 
offences, UNODC places itself in a very vulnerable position vis-à-vis its responsibility to 
respect human rights if it maintains support to law enforcement units, prosecutors or courts 
within the criminal justice system.”228   While UNODC is not a State, it is largely funded by 
States, including abolitionist States. The quote exemplifies the framework in which a State 
that provides MLA in the context of this study may incur derivative responsibility for its 
assistance in the death penalty.   However, as mentioned earlier, in terms of complicity in 
death penalty, the fact that the conduct in question is not prohibited for the primary State is 
problematic for the finding of secondary responsibility.  
5.4.1. The Obligation to Protect 
The concept of prohibiting complicity in death penalty may be supported by the “obligation 
to protect” in human rights law, that being a positive obligation requiring States to take steps 
to prevent abuses of human rights occurring, either domestically or in foreign States.229   For 
example, the right to life also contains the obligation to protect life, not only the obligation to 
abstain from unlawful killings.   In the ECHR context, this can be seen in Osman v UK, 
where the ECtHR considered that authorities may breach Article 2 if it were established that 
they knew or ought to have known that there was a real and immediate risk to the life of the 
individual concerned from the acts of a third party, and the State failed to take reasonable 
measures to avoid that risk.230    In the ICCPR context, Article 6 has also been read to require 
States to protect the right to life by preventing third party killing.231  The connection between 
the obligation to protect and the law on complicity can be seen from, for example, the fact 
                                                        
228 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC and the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights: Position Paper, 2012, p. 10. 
229 Supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 528. 
230 Osman v the United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 28 October 1998, Application 
No. 23452/94, para. 116. 
231 Supra., (note 77), General Comment 31, para. 8: “There may be circumstances in which a failure to ensure 
Covenant rights as required by article 2 would give rise to violations by States Parties of those rights, as a result 
of States Parties’ permitting or failing to take appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence to prevent, 
punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts by private persons or entities.” 
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that the duty-holding State does not need to participate directly in the human rights abuse in 
order to have international responsibility.232   
The obligation to protect in human rights law is applied in various contexts, justifying 
findings of State responsibility in situations where the actual violation is not attributable to 
the State in question.  Non-refoulement is a very relevant context for the question of this 
study, whereby States “must take action – that is, not return someone to his [or her] home 
country – in order to protect that person from abuse by that country”,233 (and other analogues 
like prohibition of extradition, as frequently discussed throughout this thesis).  The main idea 
here is that States should not place people in situations where there is risk of rights abuse: 
“the duty to protect requires States to ensure that they do not enable or assist a third party to 
engage in conduct that results in the violation of a right.”234   Depending on the context, 
through transferring the individual in question, the sending State significantly enables a third 
party to impose convention-contrary treatment (whether or not that treatment is prohibited for 
the receiving State), and “that enabling relationship seems to trigger the obligation to 
protect.”235   In the same way, it can be argued that an MLA-providing State who does not 
seek death penalty assurances significantly enables a third party (the retentionist State) to 
impose the death penalty, thus triggering the obligation to protect for the abolitionist State 
(given that the death penalty is prohibited conduct for the abolitionist State in question).  In 
this sense, it can be argued that the obligation to protect is significantly linked to complicity 
in Article 16.   
There are, however, distinctions that can be drawn between complicity and the obligation to 
protect.   For example, as provided by Helmut Aust: “an infringement upon the prohibition of 
refoulement triggers the responsibility of the extraditing State regardless of whether the 
[human rights violation] eventually materialises. […] In situations covered by the concept of 
                                                        
232 Supra., (note 186), Monica Hakimi, p. 342. 
233 Ibid., p. 343.   See also See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”), concluded 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987, UNTS vol. 
1465, (obligation where there is a risk of torture); Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, concluded 28 
July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954, UNTS vol. 189, Article 33 (obligation where life or freedom 
threatened by virtue of membership of a protected group); and supra., (note 51), Soering v the UK – which 
established the non-refoulement principle in the ECHR (derived from Article 3). In this case, extradition was not 
permitted on the grounds that the long wait on death row would amount to treatment contrary to ECHR Article 
3. 
234 Supra.,(note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 528. 
235 Supra., (note 186), Monica Hakimi, p. 367. 
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complicity [under the Articles on State Responsibility], no responsibility would intervene if 
the wrongful act of the main actor was never committed as there is no such concept as an 
attempted internationally wrongful act.”236  However, many say this is an artificial distinction 
(including Aust himself).237 
Furthermore, the previous Draft Articles on State Responsibility contained, at Article 23, a 
specific Article dedicated to responsibility of States to prevent wrongful acts (i.e. the 
obligation to protect).   The ILC’s distinction between the two areas (by originally codifying 
them in 2 separate Articles) could be argued to be evidence of disparity between the two 
concepts.  Moreover, the absence of an article to this effect in the current Articles on State 
Responsibility can be argued to be a rejection of the concept of State responsibility to prevent 
wrongful acts altogether.238    
However, it can also be forwarded that “the reason for the disappearance of the old Article 23 
[…], as well as the disappearance of many rules already contained in the previous Draft, is 
that the present members of the Commission are of the opinion that such rules do not pertain 
to State responsibility (they were not secondary rules) but rather belong to the realm of 
primary rules.” 239   On this reasoning, the obligation to protect is a primary rule, thus 
superseding Article 16 (as provided by Article 55 of the ILC Articles).   It has also been 
argued that the ILC was wrong to draw a sharp distinction between the two concepts of 
complicity and obligation to protect, and rather, that the concepts “work in tandem when 
assessing the scope of obligations”.240 
The obligation to protect has been used to justify findings of State responsibility where one 
State enables a third party’s wrongdoing, and yet that enabling action falls short of conduct 
necessary for attribution.   In extraterritorial cases, there is conceptual confusion in this area. 
For example, the reasoning of the ECtHR regularly confuses why, for instance, a State having 
“decisive influence” in another State justifies a finding of State responsibility 
extraterritorially: does responsibility find its basis in attribution (whereby attribution ascribes 
                                                        
236 Supra., (note 196), Helmut Aust, p. 396.  Also quoted in supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 529. 
237 Supra., (note 196), Helmut Aust, p. 397; supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 529. 
238 See discussion on this in supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 529; and Benedetto Conforti, “Reflections on 
state responsibility for the breach of positive obligations: the case law of the European Court of Human Rights”, 
Italian Yearbook of International Law, vol.13(1), pp. 3-10, 2003, p. 10. 
239 Ibid., Benedetto Conforti, p. 10. 
240 Supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 529. 
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abuse to the assisting state, in which case a violation of the obligation to “respect” is found), 
or does the influence engage the State’s obligation to protect (i.e. finding that the State 
violated its obligation to “protect” individuals from abuse by a third party, whereby the State 
is responsible as a bystander)?   Monica Hakimi discusses this, and how the concept of 
complicity and the obligation to protect are connected.  For example, in Cyprus v Turkey,241 
where the ECtHR found Turkey responsible as a result of abuses that the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus (“TRNC”) committed, 242 the ECtHR acknowledged that the abuses where 
not demonstrably attributable to Turkey per the rules of attribution.243  However, the ECtHR 
still found Turkey responsible, and the ECtHR “vacillated incoherently between suggesting: 
(1) that attribution was nevertheless appropriate; and (2) that Turkey had failed to satisfy an 
obligation to protect.”244    In her assessment of the ECtHR’s decisions in Cyprus v Turkey, 
and Ilaşcu v. Moldova and Russia,245 regarding extraterritorial reach of the ECHR, Monica 
Hakimi provides that: 
“In each case, the defendant state propped up and provided immense support to an 
abusive external actor. Turkey supported the Turkish Cypriot administration in 
northern Cyprus, and Russia did the same for the separatists in Moldova. But the 
claimants could not demonstrate that, since ratifying the European Convention on 
Human Rights, those states participated in the abuses at issue. The European Court of 
Human Rights nevertheless held them responsible. The court is unclear on why the 
defendant states are responsible. In the absence of evidence that the states participated 
in the particular abuses at issue, the correct answer lies in the obligation to protect. 
Turkey and Russia installed and provided considerable support to external actors that 
violated rights. Having extensively enabled those actors, the states could not lawfully 
stand by.”246 
                                                        
241 Supra., (note 148), Cyprus v Turkey. 
242 Ibid., paras. 69-80. 
243 Ibid., para. 76, the ECtHR states that: “It is not necessary to determine whether […] Turkey actually 
exercised detailed control over the policies and actions of the authorities of the TRNC”.       Note, there is much 
conceptual confusion in the ECtHR regarding the obligation to protect and attribution for the actual abuse. See 
supra., (note 186), Monica Hakimi, pp. 353-354, and p. 377: “The court determined that Turkey’s human rights 
obligations applied in northern Cyprus because Turkey exercised territorial control there.  If those obligations 
applied because of Turkey’s territorial control, then they presumably applied to all abuses in the relevant 
territory. Yet the court determined that Turkish responsibility flowed only from the abuses committed by the 
Turkish Cypriot administration (TRNC), and not from private abuses in the area. The court had difficulty 
explaining that distinction. Ultimately, it fudged its attribution analysis, justifying its finding by reference to 
Turkey’s close relationship with the TRNC. If that relationship justifies the obligation, then it is unclear why 
territorial control matters.” 
244 Supra., (note 186), Monica Hakimi, p. 353.  See also supra., (note 148), Cyprus v Turkey, paras.76-77: where 
the ECtHR uses language indicative of an “obligation to protect”, e.g. asserting that Turkey had to “secure” 
rights in that region. 
245 Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 8 July 2004, 
Application No. 44787/99. 
246 Supra., (note 186), Monica Hakimi, pp. 365-366. 
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Decisions such as the above show that the obligation to protect is connected to complicity.  
Where a State enables a third actor’s human rights violations, the State’s obligation to protect 
may be engaged, whereby it cannot justifiably standby and do nothing.  “[C]onduct akin to 
complicity (but short of the participation necessary for attribution) is […] relevant to 
appraising state bystander responsibility.”247   Similarly it can be argued here that where a 
State is asked to provide MLA for a criminal proceeding that may result in death penalty, the 
State is, if it provides the MLA, enabling imposition of the death penalty in the third State.  
This reality ignites the abolitionist State’s obligation to protect (which it can fulfil through 
obtaining death penalty assurances, or withholding MLA in the absence of such assurances). 
If it fails to do this, the State violates its’ positive obligation to protect, flowing from the right 
to life and right to be free from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (as 
codified in ECHR and the ICCPR, and enhanced by their respective protocols abolishing the 
death penalty). 
Therefore it is argued here that the obligation to protect may help remedy the limits of the 
law of complicity (and thus of Article 16 of the ILC Articles), whereby not all stringent 
requirements of Article 16 require total satisfaction. While discussing the topic of non-
refoulement, Monica Hakimi provided that: 
“[a] state that transfers someone to another state, despite the risk of abuse, usually 
does not transfer the person ‘with a view to facilitating’ that abuse. Absent some 
indication to the contrary, the state’s involvement does not rise to the level necessary 
for assisting responsibility [per Article 16]. Rather, the state is responsible because it 
fails to satisfy an obligation to protect.”248   
This shows that State responsibility for complicity is enhanced by the obligation to protect. 
The quote also exemplifies how State responsibility can be found even in the absence of full 
satisfaction of Article 16, (in the quote above, without proving that the transfer occurred 
“with a view to facilitating” the abuse, which textually a requirement of Article 16).249    
The obligation to protect, formulated as a primary obligation, supersedes Article 66 (in 
accordance to Article 55 of the Articles on State Responsibility).  “Put another way, even if 
an assisting State's conduct does not meet the stringent requirements for complicity under 
                                                        
247 Ibid., p, 354. 
248 Ibid., p. 366. 
249 As discussed in subheading 5.2.2. of this study, “The Subjective Element – Intent or Knowledge?” 
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Article 16 as discussed above, that State may nonetheless be responsible because it failed to 
satisfy an affirmative obligation to protect.”250   Thus, as the general rule of Article 16 on 
complicity does not trump what is required by the primary (i.e. special) rules, 251  the 
obligation to protect (if considered a primary rule of law) supersedes the limits of Article 16.  
This is the normative environment in which Article 16 must be analysed.252 
5.4.2. Complicity at International Law and Complicity in Torture 
The law of complicity in death penalty can also be developed and complemented by 
analysing the law of state responsibility for complicity in other areas of human rights law, 
specifically of that in torture.  The law of complicity in torture can specifically highlight what 
sort of conduct constitutes complicity in this area.253   The Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (“CAT”) explicitly prohibits complicity in 
torture, whereby Article 4(1) provides that State parties “shall ensure that all acts of torture 
are offences under its criminal law.  The same shall apply to an attempt to commit torture and 
to an act by any person which constitutes complicity or participation in torture.”254     
Unlike CAT, the ECHR and the ICCPR do not explicitly prohibit complicity in torture.  
However, prohibition of complicity in torture is implicit in the general prohibition of torture 
of these conventions, codified in Artilce 7 of the ICCPR, and Article 3 of the ECHR.255 As 
discussed in this study, a form of complicity in torture has long been prohibited, that being 
prohibition of extradition/expulsion of an individual to a State where he or she is likely to 
suffer from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  
Other findings of complicity in torture have been made in the ECHR context, which relate to 
extraordinary renditions. Extraordinary rendition is “a process by which a detainee is 
transferred to another State’s custody outside regular legal proceedings and with the prospect 
                                                        
250 Supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 529.   End of quote quoting supra., (note 186), Monica Hakimi, p. 354, 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
251 Supra., (note 196), Helmut Aust, p. 200. 
252 Ibid. 
253 Supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 531. 
254 CAT, Article 4(1). 
255 Supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 526. 
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of being subjected to torture or at least cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”256  The issue 
of complicity has been highlighted in such cases as secondary States can, to varying degrees, 
be held to have facilitated the maltreatment of individuals by the primary State. This has been 
shown specifically in the ECHR context, where European State support in unlawful rendition 
cases included things like “the granting of over flight rights, the provision of secret detention 
facilities […], and cooperation in the exchange of intelligence material.”257   For example, in 
the case Al Nashiri v Poland,258 Poland was found responsible under the ECHR for its part in 
CIA rendition activities.  The ECtHR concluded that Poland’s enabling action259 made it 
complicit in the ill-treatment of the Applicant, and thus Poland was found to have violated, 
among other Articles, Articles 2 and 3 in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol 6 (due to the 
substantial and foreseeable risk that the individual in question would be subjected to death 
penalty).260   
In the context of extraordinary renditions, the Secretary General of the CoE discussed the 
issue of complicity, stating that: 
“In accordance with the generally recognised rules on State responsibility, States may 
be held responsible for aiding or assisting another State in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act. There can be little doubt that aid or assistance by agents 
of a State party in the commission of human rights abuses by agents of another State 
acting within the former’s jurisdiction would constitute a violation of the Convention. 
Even acquiescence and connivance of the authorities in the acts of foreign agents 
affecting Convention rights might engage the State party’s responsibility under the 
Convention.”261 
The meaning of complicity in torture at international law varies somewhat depending on the 
specific source and context analysed.  As discussed, international criminal law’s definition of 
the concept varies from that of State responsibility.  According to the International Criminal 
                                                        
256 Supra., (note 1), Helmut Aust, p. 120. 
257 Ibid., p. 120. 
258 Supra., (note 58), Al Nashiri v Poland. For other rendition and complicity cases, see e.g. El-Masri v The 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 13 December 2012, 
Application No. 39630/09; and Abdulkhakov v Russia, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 2 
October 2012, Application No. 14743/11. 
259 Enabled the CIA to use a Polish airport, provided logistics, complicit in disguising movements of the 
rendition aircraft, cooperation with the whole process and so on (accompanied by conclusion by the ECtHR that 
Poland knew of the nature and purposes of the CIA’s activities on its territory). 
260 Supra., (note 58), Al Nashiri v Poland, paras. 576-579. 
261 Council of Europe, Report of the Secretary General on the Use of His Powers under Article 52 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights, Report SG/Inf, 2006, para. 23. 
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Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), thus in the context of individual criminal 
responsibility, findings of complicity in torture require satisfaction of 3 elements: 1) 
knowledge that torture is taking place; 2) a contribution by way of assistance; and 3) that the 
contribution has substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime itself.262   However, CAT’s 
monitoring body, the UN Committee Against Torture (“CAT Committee”), takes a wider 
view of complicity, whereby “acquiescence” and “tacit consent” is enough, as is constructive 
as well as actual knowledge that torture is taking place.263   The CAT Committee is also does 
not appear to require that the assistance have substantial effect on the perpetration of the 
eventual torture.264 
The JCHR discussed these two meanings, and distinguished them on the basis that the ICTY 
is dealing with individual criminal responsibility, while the CAT definition is focussed on 
State responsibility. 265    Thus, as mentioned earlier, the JCHR took the view that State 
complicity in torture “means simply one State giving assistance to another State in the 
commission of torture, or acquiescing in such torture, in the knowledge, including 
constructive knowledge, of the circumstances of the torture which is or has been taking 
place”.266   This is supported by the CoE Secretary General’s comment above, that, in the 
context of rendition activities, “[e]ven acquiescence and connivance of the authorities in the 
acts of foreign agents affecting Convention rights might engage the State party’s 
responsibility under the Convention.”267 
Further, in defining what amounts to State responsibility per Article 16 in terms of assistance 
in torture, the JCHR read the Articles on State Responsibility in conjunction with other rules 
and definitions in international law on complicity (like those stemming from CAT and the 
ICTY Statute).268   This suggests, as argued in this study, that Article 16 is not determinative 
                                                        
262 Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute provides for individual criminal responsibility: “A person who planned, 
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a 
crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime."   The 3 
elements of complicity in ICTY derived from Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija, International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia, Judgment of 10 December 1998, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T.  See also  
See also supra., (note 217), JCHR, para. 31. 
263 Supra., (note 217), JCHR, para. 32. 
264 Ibid.   
265 Ibid., paras. 34-35. 
266 Ibid., para. 35.    See also supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 530. 
267 Supra., (note 261), Secretary General of CoE, para. 23. 
268 Supra., (note 1) Bharat Malkani, p. 531. 
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of the question of State complicity, thus supporting the argument that the limits of Article 16 
can be overcome for the question at hand. 
5.5. Overcoming Limitations 
5.5.1. Internationally Wrongful Act of the Committing State: Part 2 
The lex specialis of complicity in death penalty, as analysed in this chapter, exemplifies how 
Article 16 of the ILC Articles is not, in and of itself, determinative of the question of State 
complicity in capital punishment.  With this in mind, we can return to one of the problematic 
criterions outlined at the beginning of this chapter, that Article 16 explicitly dictates that State 
responsibility only arises where a State voluntarily assists another State “in carrying out 
conduct which violates the international obligations of the latter”,269  (i.e. that the State 
committing the allegedly wrongful act must be legally prohibited from doing so).270  As 
already discussed, this is problematic in the context of this study, as the State in which the 
criminal proceeding (and thus death penalty) is occurring is, most likely, a death penalty 
retentionist State, and therefore the State is not legally prohibited from imposing capital 
punishment.  Thus, by the text of the provision, there is no internationally wrongful act for 
the abolitionist State to be complicit in.    
However, this study again highlights that Article 16 may be “remedied by resort to primary 
rules that take precedence as lex specialis”.271   Relevant lex specialis can be located in 
extradition and non-refoulement cases, and unlawful rendition cases, as already discussed 
throughout this study.  This study uses three examples from the ECHR framework, Al-
Saadoon and Mufdhi v the UK, F.G. v Sweden, and Al Nashiri v Poland, to argue that 
complicity in death penalty can be found, despite capital punishment being legal in the 
principal State imposing it. 
                                                        
269 ILC Commentary to Article 16, para. 1. See also, Supra., (note 25), James Crawford, p. 148. (italics added). 
This can be seen directly in the wording of Article 16 itself: the state assists “in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act by the latter […]” (italics added). 
270 Supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 527. 
271 Supra., (note 219), Aristoteles Constantinides, p. 147;   per ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Article 55. 
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In Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v the UK, the ECtHR concluded that the UK violated the ECHR 
by transferring the applicants to Iraq, as there were substantial grounds for believing that 
there was a real risk of the applicants being subjected to the death penalty.272   In F.G. v 
Sweden, the ECtHR concluded that, considering the alleged risk of the applicant facing 
capital punishment in Iran, Sweden would be in violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR if 
it removed the applicant to Iran without the Swedish authorities making and ex nuc 
assessment of the consequences of this conversion. 273    In Al Nashiri v Poland, Poland 
assisted in the unlawful rendition activities of the US, including assisting the US to secretly 
fly Al Nashiri out of Poland, despite the real and foreseeable risk that the applicant would be 
subjected to further torture and the death penalty in the US. The ECtHR found that the 
Poland’s assistance in the transfer of Al Nashiri from Poland to the US, when where there 
was foreseeable risk of exposure to capital punishment, violated both Article 2 and 3 of the 
ECHR, stating that: “Article 2 of the Convention prohibits the extradition or deportation of an 
individual to another State where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that he 
or she would face a real risk of being subjected to the death penalty there.”274   
These cases are highlighted as they all have something in common: the death penalty is 
legally permissible for the State imposing the sanction (Iran, Iraq and the US).  Thus, the 
State imposing (or potentially imposing) capital punishment in each case is not committing 
an internationally wrongful act by doing so.  Despite this, the ECHR-contracting States in 
these cases (the UK, Sweden and Poland) were all found responsible under the ECHR for 
their involvement in the acts in question. 
This is very relevant for ascertaining the lex specialis of complicity in death penalty, and the 
way in which Article 16 of the ILC Articles should be viewed.  In these cases, the issue was 
not whether the receiving State would be in violation of international law if it executed the 
individuals in question.275  The legal justification for prohibiting abolitionist States from 
                                                        
272 Supra., (note 37), Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v the UK, paras. 144-145.  Violation of Article 3 was found. In 
view of finding vilation of Article 3, the ECtHR stated: “the Court does not consider it necessary to decide 
whether there have also been violations of the applicants’ rights under Article 2 of the Convention and Article 1 
of Protocol No. 13.” 
273  Supra., (note 59), F.G. v Sweden, para. 110: “At the outset the Court observes that in the context of 
expulsion, where there are substantial grounds to believe that the person in question, if expelled, would face a 
real risk of capital punishment, torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the destination 
country, both Articles 2 and 3 imply that the Contracting State must not expel that person.” 
274 Supra., (note 58), Al Nashiri v Poland, paras. 576-579.  
275 Supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 535. 
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extraditing/expelling individuals to face the death penalty in retentionist States depends on 
the treaty obligations of the sending State.  The same can be said for the assistance in the 
transfer of Al Nashiri in the unlawful rendition case of Al Nashiri v Poland. Poland’s 
assistance in the transfer of the applicant to the US violated its obligations per ECHR Articles 
2 and 3, due to Poland’s abolitionist legal obligations per the ECHR, and irrespective of the 
legality of the death penalty in the US. 
Such cases have exemplified how the threshold of Article 16 of the ILC Articles may have 
been modified in this respect: the abolitionist State can incur responsibility, based on the real 
risk of the death penalty, irrespective of the primary State’s own responsibility.276  Thus, this 
study submits that this textual limitation of Article 16 of the ILC Articles can be overcome in 
the case at hand.  What is materially important is the obligations of abolitionist States with 
respect to the death penalty, and not whether the capital punishment-imposing State is itself 
in violation of an international obligation. 
5.5.2. Wrongful Conduct Must Have Occurred 
On the same line, as discussed earlier in this chapter, another limitation presented in the ILC 
Commentary to Article 16 is that the eventual wrongful conduct needs to have actually 
occurred.277   Thus, as discussed, the act (the death penalty, or a death penalty sentence) 
would actually have to occur in order to establish responsibility of the abolitionist State for its 
provision of MLA per Article 16 of the ILC Articles (irrespective of the foreseeable risk of 
the imposition of capital punishment by the MLA-receiving State). Therefore, if 
responsibility ensued, it would do so only upon the death penalty sentence being imposed 
(not upon the act of providing MLA without having obtained requisite assurances) as, in the 
framework of the ILC Articles, “there is no such concept as an attempted internationally 
wrongful act.”278 
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However, extradition cases have also exemplified how responsibility of the sending-State can 
be established for its complicity in wrongful conduct, regardless of whether or not this 
conduct eventually materialises. 279   Responsibility of the aiding State is often found before 
the extradition takes place, or after it takes place but before prosecution in finalised.  This is 
due to the significant risk of capital punishment (or other proscribed ill-treatment).  Thus, it is 
likely that this limitation can also be overcome in the case at hand.  This “risk-based” 
responsibility is elaborated on in the following subchapter.  
5.6. Conceptual Issues in Comparing Non-Refoulement (and Other Analogues) to 
Complicity  
The conclusions in 5.5.1. and 5.5.2. above may be problematized by an important distinction 
between non-refoulement/prohibition of extradition and the concept of complicity.   It can be 
argued that prohibition of extradition to face torture or the death penalty is not complicity in 
an internationally wrongful act; the exposure of a person to such risk is an internationally 
wrongful act in and of itself (if the question was to be reviewed per the ILC Articles and not 
under the framework of the conventions in question).280    Thus, it can be argued that there is 
an international obligation incumbent on abolitionist States not to extradite under such 
circumstances; and thus, if a State were to extradite, it could be argued that this entails the 
primary international responsibility of that State per Article 1 and 2 of the ILC Articles, as 
opposed to derivative responsibility via Article 16.  Thus, “[t]he responsibility of the State 
which has extradited or repelled the person is not triggered for the reason of its support to the 
eventual maltreatment, but for the fact that it exposed the individual to that danger.”281  As 
discussed throughout this chapter, within the concept of complicity under Article 16 of the 
ILC Articles, the wrongfulness of the aid or assistance is dependent on the wrongfulness of 
the main State’s conduct, whereas primary responsibility is not concerned with another States 
wrongdoing. 
                                                        
279 Ibid., p. 397. 
280 Note, again, that although the ILC Articles are relevant considerations for establishing the responsibility of 
States in the ECHR and HRC context, the ECtHR and HRC generally fail to mention the ILC Articles at all in 
their jurisprudence. Thus, whether these extradition/expulsion/non-refoulement cases constitute primary 
responsibility or derivative responsibility is not discussed or ascertained in either context: “The ILC Articles are 
virtually never explicitly mentioned in HRC discussions or for that matter in those of other human rights treaty 
organs.” (Supra.,(note 175), Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Dan Sarooshi, p. 167). 
281 Supra., (note 196), Helmut Aust, p. 396. 
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In one sense this argument, alongside the discussed parallels between extradition to face the 
death penalty and provision of MLA in support of a criminal proceeding which may result in 
the death penalty, supports the argument of the preceding chapters, that provision of MLA 
under the circumstances of this study may attract the primary responsibility of the abolitionist 
State for independently wrongful conduct.   However, as discussed, jurisdictional limits may 
impede the finding of primary responsibility in this context.  Thus, some may argue that this 
distinction between complicity and extradition should be upheld, whereby the two should not 
be compared to build a case for prohibition of complicity in the death penalty through 
provision of MLA, as they are conceptually different structures from a legal point of view. 
However, the interpretation that these are fundamentally different concepts relies on a very 
narrow view of Article 16 of the ILC Articles, which, as pointed out by discussions on the lex 
specialis on complicity, may not be legally accurate: “While Article 16 […] is the generally 
recognized form in which States may incur responsibility for complicity in international law, 
other forms of complicity exist and do not fall within the scope of this provision.”282  When 
examined closely, the structural differences between the complicity and non-refoulement are 
not very strong.   For example, under both concepts, ultimately the wrongfulness is still 
dependent on the conduct of a third State:  
“If State A is about to extradite Person B to State C in which B is likely to suffer 
torture or inhuman and degrading treatment, the conduct of State C is decisive for 
both responsibility for complicity and refoulement. The difference lies in the fact that 
in the complicity scenario it needs to be established that the wrongful treatment of B 
has actually intervened whereas in the refoulement scenario it is sufficient that there 
are serious grounds to believe that B will be subjected to these forms of treatment. It 
is thus doubtful whether there exists a qualitative difference between these two 
conditions which would exclude the interpretation of the principle of non-refoulement 
as a form of lex specialis for complicity.”283 
From a broader perspective, while some differences exist between non-refoulement and 
complicity, the concepts are still significantly connected.  Some, like Helmut Aust, suggest 
that prohibition of extradition to face torture or death penalty establishes “risk-based 
responsibility for complicity”284 (whereby responsibility ensues due to the significant risk of 
maltreatment, regardless of whether or not the eventual conduct occurs, and regardless of 
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whether or not the eventual conduct is legally prohibited or permissible for the primary 
State).  This may be justified by the fundamental nature of the right to life and the right to be 
free from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (and, perhaps, the right 
not to be subjected to the death penalty),285 as these rights enshrine some of the most basic 
values of societies.286  The lowering of the threshold is necessary in order to establish State 
responsibility in extradition cases, so that torture, capital punishment or extrajudicial killing 
can be prevented from occurring in the first place.  Thus, the change from an assessment of 
whether or not wrongful conduct has actually been committed, or whether or not the conduct 
is internationally wrongful for the committing State, to the assessment of an intervening risk 
“is warranted from the viewpoint of an optimum protection of susceptible victims”.287   With 
this understanding, the position of this study is that the concept of non-refoulement (and other 
analogues) and the concept complicity codified in Article 16 actually complement each other, 
working in tandem in the assessment of complicity in the death penalty in the case at hand. 
5.7. The Scope of “Aid or Assistance” 
5.7.1.   Contribution 
This study notes that the mens rea element of complicity (the knowledge/intent discussion 
above) must also be accompanied by sufficient actus reus (whereby the aid or assistance 
must sufficiently contribute to the wrongful act in question in order for responsibility to 
ensue).   The ILC has not defined what conduct constitutes sufficient “aid or assistance” to 
incur derivative responsibility per Article 16.  Thus, questions arise as to how much 
contribution the secondary State needs to make in order to satisfy a finding of complicity.  
Nikolai Ushakov has highlighted the problem of contribution.  He discussed that the 
aid/assistance cannot be too direct in character, as then the contributing State would become a 
                                                        
285 Supra., (note 37), Alsaadoon v Mufdhi, para. 118: “The court considers that, in respect of those states which 
are bound by it, the right under article 1 of Protocol No 13 not to be subjected to the death penalty, which 
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co-author of the offence (and this goes beyond complicity).   However, the participation also 
cannot be too indirect, as then there would be no real complicity in the act.288 
The Commentary of the ILC in the Articles on State Responsibility adds some confusion on 
the matter.  In its Commentary, the ILC has explained that “there is no requirement that the 
aid or assistance should have been essential to the performance of the internationally 
wrongful act; it is sufficient if it contributed significantly to that act.”289  Thus, it would 
appear that significant contribution to the act is required.  However, in another paragraph of 
the Commentary on Article 16, the ILC provides that in some cases “the assistance may have 
been only an incidental factor in the commission of the primary act, and may have 
contributed only to a minor degree, if at all, to the injury suffered.”290 
Causality is also a relevant consideration in the discussion of contribution. The ILC has also 
clearly stated that “the assisting State will only be responsible to the extend that its own 
conduct has caused or contributed to the internationally wrongful act.”291  Thus, it has been 
suggested that in determining what constitutes aid or assistance in Article 16, issues of 
causality need to be taken into account.292  However, causality in international law is not a 
straightforward concept, and thus it does not really clarify the confusion noted above.  While 
causality is relevant in the discussion, it is clear that any “but for” test of causality in 
reference to complicity is not required.293  In cases where a “but for” or condition sine qua 
non circumstances are found, it may be more likely that independent responsibility of the 
“assisting” State would be found, 294  as, if a State has itself primarily caused an 
internationally wrongful act, why would it incur only derivative responsibility?  However, 
while “but for” causality may not be required, it is clear that some form of causality will be 
necessary in questions of State complicity.295  
                                                        
288 Nikolai Ushakov, Statement at the 1519th Meeting of the International Law Commission, Year Book of the 
International Law Commission, vol. I, 1978, p. 239, para. 11. 
289 ILC Commentary on Article 16, para. 5. See also supra., (note 25); James Crawford, p.149. 
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292 Supra., (note 196), Helmut Aust, p. 210. 
293 Ibid., p. 212. 
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The above emphasises the fact that what constitutes aid or assistance within the meaning of 
Article 16 is not all that clear.  Evidently, not all acts of assistance will apply: “it is 
implausible that Article 16 should cover 'aid or assistance' which is only remotely or 
'indirectly' related to an internationally wrongful act.” 296   It has been discussed that 
contribution needs to be “significant” so as to “exclude any marginal participation”.297  It has 
also been stated that there must be some sort of special nexus between the aid and the 
wrongful act (albeit, as noted above, the conduct need not be an essential “but for” condition 
to the unlawful act taking place).298  On assessment of what constitutes sufficient aid or 
assistance in the context of ILC Article 16, Helmut Aust provided that “it does not appear to 
be possible to provide abstract and normative criteria of what could constitute complicity in 
each and every conceivable situation.  Rather, the assessment whether the support a State is 
rendering to another State constitutes aid or assistance within the meaning of Article 16 [of 
the ILC Articles] needs to be established with respect to the facts of the specific case.”299 
5.7.2. MLA-Providing State’s Contribution to the Death Penalty 
Thus, for the case at hand, if it were established that it is immaterial that death penalty is not 
an unlawful act of the MLA-receiving State, it must still be established if provision of MLA 
without obtaining death penalty assurances is sufficiently linked to the possibility of judicial 
execution that abolitionist States would incur responsibility for assistance in the death 
penalty.  Drawing on the discussions of complicity in torture, in a supplementary 
memorandum to the JCHR, Philippe Sands stated that the contribution of the assisting State 
must have a “substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime”.300  In the same report, the 
JCHR also assessed and provided examples for what sort of conduct may constitute 
complicity in torture, which would thus attract responsibility per Article 16 of the Articles on 
State Responsibility.  The JCHR provided that, among other examples, the following would 
amount to complicity in torture:  “The provision of information to […] a foreign intelligence 
service enabling them to apprehend a terrorism suspect [who is then tortured].”301   This is 
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relevant in the context of complicity in death penalty through provision of MLA, as parallels 
can be drawn to between provision of information that leads to torture, and provision of 
information that leads to death penalty.  If the former amounts to complicity in torture, surely 
the latter amounts to complicity in death penalty. 
In the case at hand, provision of MLA without obtaining assurances that the death penalty 
will not be imposed does not simply make it materially easier for the MLA-receiving State to 
inflict harm on the individual concerned; in many cases, it may make it possible.302  Thus, it 
is submitted here that provision of MLA in the context of this study is conduct sufficiently 
proximate to imposition of the death penalty by the latter State, and a form of “causality” in 
such circumstances can be established.   The MLA provided, where the State specifically 
does not obtain death penalty assurances, can have a substantial effect on the criminal 
proceeding in question, and thus a substantial effect on the imposition of the death penalty.   
This is exemplified by the importance of UK evidence in the case Maha Elgizouli, where 
prosecution of El Sheikh in the US “depends critically on the evidence which has been 
obtained by the British authorities”.303   Thus, the position taken in this study is that provision 
of MLA without obtaining assurances has a special nexus to judicial execution in a foreign 
State, constituting sufficient “aid or assistance” to incur derivative responsibility in terms 
stipulated by Article 16 of the Articles on State Responsibility.  
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6. Conclusion 
This study has analysed whether abolitionist States party to the ICCPR and/or the ECHR are 
prohibited from providing MLA to retentionist States for use in criminal proceedings which 
may result in death penalty, in the absence of assurances that the death penalty will not be 
imposed.  When considering the extent to which abolitionist States can be held responsible in 
these circumstances, we are presented with a complex web of international legal doctrine. 
This study has considered how the relevant rules and principles operate and interact, with the 
aim of determining the conditions in which abolitionist States may be held responsible for 
facilitating the use of the death penalty through the provision of MLA. 
At the outset, we have the primary rules and principles stemming from international human 
rights law (in the context of this study, those derived from the ICCPR and, at the regional 
level, from the ECHR).  Running parallel to these rules are the ILC’s Articles on State 
Responsibility, which direct when and how State action may entail the international 
responsibility of that State.  The ECtHR and the HRC rarely discuss the ILC Articles in their 
judgments, and the “[t]he interplay between State responsibility under human rights law and 
State responsibility under the ILC Articles is not straightforward, and has caused much 
consternation for lawyers and commentators alike.”304  However, these frameworks are not 
mutually exclusive, and thus this study has assessed the research question through a unified 
perspective. 
In the context of direct responsibility, the ILC Articles provide that “Every internationally 
wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State”;305 and defines 
that an act is internationally wrongful where: 1) the conduct is attributable to the State under 
international law; and 2) the conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the 
State.306  Attribution of conduct to the abolitionist State in the context of this study will 
generally be straightforward, as decisions to provide MLA stem from the abolitionist State’s 
executive government.  The more ambiguous element is that of subsection 2, whether there 
exists an international obligation on abolitionist States to withhold provision of MLA in the 
absence of adequate death penalty assurances.    
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Chapter 2 of this study assessed whether such an obligation can be discerned from the 
existing human rights law codified in the ICCPR and the ECHR, and their relevant additional 
protocols.  This study examined vast parallels between the obligation on abolitionist States 
not to extradite individuals to face the death penalty, and the (proposed) obligation not to 
provide MLA which may assist imposition of the death penalty; arriving at the conclusion 
that recognition of the latter obligation is a natural and inevitable extension of the former.  
This conclusion is derived through uncovering the rationale of the HRC and ECtHR in 
recognising the obligation in the extradition context, primarily through discerning and 
analysing 1) the principle of non-facilitation of capital punishment; 2) the European 
framework’s opposition to the death penalty “in all circumstances”; 3) the prohibition of 
reintroduction of capital punishment; and 4) examining how relevant conventions, as “living 
instruments”, have and may evolve.   
If the obligation on abolitionist States to withhold MLA in the absence of death penalty 
assurances was recognised, then, if a State proceeded to provide MLA without such 
assurances, this act would amount to a breach of this international obligation (thus satisfying 
Article 2(b) of the ILC Articles).  This would, therefore, equate to an internationally wrongful 
act, entailing the direct international responsibility of the abolitionist State.307 
However, there are conceptual discrepancies between extradition and the provision of MLA, 
which may prove fatal to recognising the international obligation asserted above.  As 
discussed in Chapter 3, “Jurisdiction” in ECHR Article 1 and ICCPR Article 2(1), and in 
their relevant respective additional protocols, functions to delimit the individuals to whom 
States owe their human rights obligations (whereby State parties do not owe obligations to 
anyone beyond their jurisdiction).  This is problematic in the context of this study, as the 
capital punishment-facing individual is not, and perhaps never was, in the territorial 
jurisdiction of the MLA-providing State.  Conversely, in extradition cases, while the risk of 
death penalty is similarly located extraterritorially, the individual in question is, or was (in 
reactive cases), within the territorial jurisdiction of the abolitionist State.  Therefore, a 
jurisdictional link can be drawn in extradition cases, whereby the abolitionist State is 
responsible for the conditions in which it forces the capital punishment-facing individual to 
exit its borders. 
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While this may be so, it possible that existing categories of extraterritorial jurisdiction under 
the ECHR and the ICCPR can be further defined to establish a jurisdictional link in the 
context of this study.  The abolitionist State’s involvement in the foreign criminal proceeding 
can be argued to be an exercise of public powers in the retentionist State, whereby the MLA-
providing State is producing effects extraterritorially.  Moreover, the MLA-providing State 
can be argued to be exercising power and control over the capital punishment-facing 
individual, as “[t]he authorities are certainly exercising jurisdiction over the essential legal 
interests of the person regardless of their physical location.”308   Furthermore, there is also 
room to argue that “jurisdictional limits need not be determinative of the scope of abolitionist 
States' […] obligations to refrain from facilitating the use of the death penalty elsewhere.”309   
The argument here is that States should not be disposing of their own adopted laws and 
policies on human rights protection on a purely mechanical level.310 
Ultimately, if jurisdiction cannot be established in the circumstances of this study, then the 
direct responsibility of the abolitionist State also cannot be established.  However, provision 
of MLA under the circumstances of this study may, rather, be viewed as complicity in the 
death penalty, thus entailing the derivative, as opposed to primary, responsibility of the 
abolitionist State.  The interplay between human rights law and the ILC Articles in the 
context of complicity is equally complex.  The ILC Articles position on complicity is as 
follows:  
“A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: (a) that State 
does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and 
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.”311 
A purely textual reading of Article 16 and its accompanying commentary would prove fatal 
for the claim that abolitionist States are complicit in the death penalty in the circumstances of 
this study, as: 1) the act (death penalty) is not likely to be internationally wrongful for the 
                                                        
308 Supra., (note 3) Robert Currie, (page number unknown – no page numbers provided in SSRN version of text 
download). 
309 Supra., (note 1), Bharat Malkani, p. 555. 
310 Supra., (note 3) Robert Currie, (page number unknown – no page numbers provided in SSRN version of text 
download). 
311 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Article 16. 
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capital punishment-imposing State;312 2) it would be rare that the abolitionist State intends to 
facilitate the death penalty through its conduct (and even if it did, this would be arduous to 
prove); 313  and 3) the allegedly wrongful act may never actually eventuate (whereby 
responsibility could not ensue upon the act of providing MLA despite a foreseeable risk of 
death penalty, and rather would only ensue upon capital punishment actually being 
imposed).314  
However, the ILC Articles have a dynamic relationship with the broader international legal 
framework.  As provided by Article 55 of the ILC Articles, relevant primary rules pertaining 
to the law of complicity in the death penalty take precedence over Article 16 (as lex 
specialis), and thus may remedy the aforementioned limits of the Article.  Relevant primary 
rules in this area can be argued to be more “far reaching” than Article 16’s formulation of 
complicity.315   
Thus, the argument presented Chapter 5 is that Article 16 of the ILC Articles can be bolstered 
by the lex specialis on complicity in the use of death penalty, to overcome the 
aforementioned limits of the Article, and thus enabling recognition of the derivate 
responsibility of abolitionist States for provision of MLA without requisite assurances.  
Relevant lex specialis can be located in the “obligation to protect”, the concepts of complicity 
located in other areas of human rights law, the obligation to refrain from imposing the death 
penalty, and the prohibition of extradition to face the death penalty.  Consequently, this study 
arrives at the conclusion that, despite the legality of capital punishment in the sanction-
imposing State, and in spite of the likely lack of intent of the MLA-providing State to assist 
the imposition of the death penalty, and regardless of whether or not capital punishment 
eventually materialises, abolitionist States may be found responsible for their “aid and 
assistance” in the death penalty through their provision of MLA. 
                                                        
312 Ibid., A State is responsible where it “assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful 
act by the latter” (italics added). 
313 ILC Commentary to Article 16, para. 3: the aid/assistance must be given “with a view of facilitating the 
commission of that act.”  The ILC elaborates on this at para. 5: stating that the aiding State will not be 
responsible under Article 16 unless the State organ concerned intended, by the assistance given, to facilitate the 
occurrence of the wrongful conduct. 
314 ILC Commentary to Article 16, para 5: the wrongful conduct (death penalty) must actually occur. 
315 Supra., (note 196), Helmut Aust, p. 390. 
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Accordingly, this study considers that it is time to recognise that abolitionist States party to 
the ECHR and/or the ICCPR are prohibited from providing MLA for use in foreign 
proceedings that may result in death penalty, in the absence of adequate assurances that 
capital punishment will not be imposed.  At its core, the reasoning is simple: to do otherwise 
would amount to facilitating a practice which is forbidden for that State.316  The author sees 
no compelling reason to sustain the artificial divide between extradition and provision of 
MLA in the circumstances of this study.  The same legal reasoning should apply here as in 
the transfer of persons: “states that have abolished capital punishment may not assist in 
bringing about the death penalty in other countries.”317   
In asserting the above, this study closes with the following statement by Lord Kerr in the 
Supreme Court judgment of Maha Elgizouli, where His Honour expressed his minority view 
that the law has in fact developed so as to prohibit abolitionist States from providing MLA to 
retentionist States in context examined in this thesis: 
 “Law, [...] if it is operating as it should, must be responsive to society’s 
contemporary needs, standards and values. It is a commonplace that these are in a 
state of constant change. That is an essential part of the human condition and 
experience. As a deeper understanding of the human psyche and the enlightenment of 
society increase with the onward march of education, tolerance and forbearance in 
relation to our fellow citizens, the law must march step-by-step with that progress. I 
am convinced that the adjustment to the […] law which I propose reflects the 
contemporary standards and values of our society.”318 
 
                                                        
316 Bharat Malkani, “Emerging Voices: Does International Law Forbid Complicity in the Death Penalty?”, 
Opiniojuris website, published 15 August 2013, available at: http://opiniojuris.org/2013/08/15/emerging-voices-
does-international-law-forbid-complicity-in-the-death-penalty/ (last visited10 April 2020). 
317 Supra., (note 97), Special Rapporteur on extradition, summary or arbitrary executions, para. 102. 
318 Supra., (note 9), Maha Elgizouli (SC decision), Lord Kerr minority judgment, para. 144. 
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